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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Bayesian Multilevel Analysis of Binary Time-Series Cross-Sectional Data
in Political Economy
by
Xun Pang
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Washington University in St. Louis, 2010
Andrew D. Martin and Jeff Gill, Co-Chairs
In this dissertation project, I propose a Bayesian generalized linear multilevel model
with pth order autoregressive errors (GLMM-AR(p)) for modeling inter-temporal dependence, con-temporary correlation, and heterogeneity of unbalanced binary TimeSeries Cross-Sectional data. The model includes two unnested sources of clustering in
the unit- and time-dimensions for analyzing heterogeneities and contemporal correlation which are salient in the era of globalization. Group-level variations are further
explained with unit- and time-specific characteristics. For handling dynamics in politics and political economy, I apply the autoregressive error specification to analyze
serial correlation which may not be fully captured by the selected covariates.
Two applications on civil war and sovereign default demonstrate how the proposed
model controls for multiple potential confounders. It also improves reliability of statistical inferences and helps forecasts by more efficiently using the information in data.
The first application focuses on the causal relationship between ethnic minority rule
and civil war onset. The GLMM-AR(p) model helps study those background factors
which affect the relationship under investigation. The second applied study considers
how regime duration affects sovereign default conditional on regime type by putting
the national policy-making regarding repaying external debt into the international
iii

context. To model the heterogeneous vulnerability or sensitivity of the developing
countries to global shocks, I extend the GLMM-AR(p) model to analyze time-specific
unit-varying effects.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data are very important in political science,
especially in the subfields of international relations and comparative politics. TSCS
data are rich in structure: multiple units are repeatedly measured over time, and one
of the major subjects under scientific investigation is dynamic evolution of those units.
At the same time, observations are clustered in the spatial dimension with measurements equally spaced over time, which is not necessarily the case for other types of
longitudinal data. In TSCS analysis, the spatial relationship among the units is substantively interesting, especially in the era of globalization (Franzse and Hays, 2007).
TSCS data, belonging to the family of longitudinal data, also have spatial structure;
therefore, they should be analyzed in a three-dimensional space (Gelman and Hill,
2006; Gill, 2007; Beck and Katz, 2007; Shor et al., 2007). The structure of TSCS
data offers a good opportunity for both dynamic analysis and spatial relationship
investigation, but it also implies multiple sources of correlation which confounds the
causal relationships of research interest and raises several methodological challenges.
However, in the literature on longitudinal data analysis, little effort has been made
1

to model inter-temporal dependence, contemporary correlation and heterogeneity at
the same time and in the non-linear framework. This dissertation project seeks to
remedy this deficit.
Chapter 2, Bayesian Generalized Linear Multilevel Model with AR(p) Errors ,
proposes a very general model for modeling unbalanced binary Time-Series CrossSectional (TSCS) data by considering correlation in both the time and spatial dimensions. By controlling for heterogeneities in the two dimensions and modeling the
dynamic error process, the proposed model handles the inefficiency and endogeneity problems resulting from the generic TSCS data structure. With the stationarity
restriction on the error process, the model can also be used as a residual-based cointegration test on discrete TSCS data. Methodologically, to handle the model estimation
difficulties, I develop an efficient Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm by orthogonalizing the errors with the Cholesky decomposition and adding an auxiliary variable.
I also apply the parameter expansion method to further improve mixing and speed
up convergence of the Markov chain. Simulated and empirical examples are used to
assess the performance of the model and techniques.
Chapter 3, Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset: How Much Background
Factors and Dynamics Matter, revisits the debate about the impact of ethnic minority
rule (EMR) on civil war onset. To explain the variation of EMR’s effect and to improve statistical prediction of civil war onset, this chapter applies the GLMM-AR(p)
model to carefully handles multiple confounders caused by the TSCS structure of the
civil war data and by the measures of EMR. The relationship between civil war and
EMR is found to be affected by several background factors including regime stability
and governance quality. Modeling the stochastic process of the errors dramatically
improves forecasting, suggesting that information in the errors, which has often been
neglected, is valuable for understanding the dynamics of civil war.
2

Finally, in Chapter 4, Sovereign Default: Regime Type, Regime Duration, and
Vulnerability to Global Shocks, I extend the GLMM-AR(p) model with a multifactor
specification to exam the regime-specific effect of regime duration on sovereign default
by putting this national policy-making into its international context. The empirical
findings include that regime duration has different meanings in anocracies and nonanocracies in terms of explaining sovereign default. Empirical evidence also suggests
that shocks in the international system strongly affect national decision-making regarding sovereign default in the developing countries, and the impact of globalization
varies widely from country to country.

3

Chapter 2
Bayesian Generalized Linear
Multilevel Model with AR(p)
Errors

2.1

Motivations

Time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data are a very important type of data in
political science, especially in the subfields of international relations and comparative
politics. Political scientists have made a great effort to handle the methodological
issues posed by the structural characteristics of such data1 . TSCS data are rich in
structure: multiple units are repeatedly measured over time, and one of the major
1

There have been numerous great methodological discussions on TSCS data, such as Beck and
Katz (1995), Beck and Katz (1996), Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998), Beck et al. (2002), only to name
a very small portion of them in the political methodology literature. In 2007, Political Analysis
published a special issue (volumn 15) on the substantive and methodological questions in TSCS
data analysis.

4

subjects under scientific investigation is dynamic evolution of those units. At the same
time, observations are clustered in the spatial dimension with measurements equally
spaced over time, which is not necessarily the case for other types of longitudinal data.
In TSCS analysis, the spatial relationship among the units is of research interest,
especially in the era of globalization (Franzse and Hays, 2007). Hence, TSCS data,
belonging to the family of longitudinal data, also have spatial structure; therefore,
they should be analyzed in a three-dimensional space (Gelman and Hill, 2006; Gill,
2007; Beck and Katz, 2007; Shor et al., 2007). The structure of TSCS data offers a
good opportunity for both dynamic analysis and spatial relationship investigation, but
it also implies multiple sources of correlation which confounds the causal relationship
of research interest and raises several methodological challenges.
The correlation design of TSCS data is based on both the time and spatial dimensions of hierarchy. Analyzing heterogeneities in both dimensions is easy with
multilevel modeling in classical and Bayesian frameworks (Schafer and Yucel, 2002;
Renard, Molenberghs and Geys, 2004; Molenberghs and Verbeke, 2005, Chapter 14
and Chapter 22) by using well-developed softwares, such as the lme4 R package,
JAGS/BUGS and the SAS program. However, when serial correlation is considered at
the same time, computational complexity dramatically increases, especially for categorical responses and nonlinear model setups. Yet, directly modeling correlated
errors is necessary for reliable statistical references and forecasts, and there do not
exist easy alternatives. Including lagged values of the response variable (observed
or latent) or/and lagged explanatory variables (LDVs/LIDVs) has been often recommended and implemented (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998; Beck et al., 2002), but
LDVs and LIDVs approaches cannot serve as substitutes for directly modeling serial
dependence in the error term (Chib and Jeliazkov, 2006). First, there are multiple
sources of intertemporal correlation, including dynamics, unmodeled heterogeneities,
5

omitted variables, measurement error, and so on. Dynamics can be partly captured
by LDVs/LIDVs, but this cannot tell whether the errors are still correlated because
of other sources of correlation. Therefore, it is necessary to check and correct serial
correlation by directly and adequately modeling the dynamic error process even after
LDVs or LIDVs are included. Second, unlike in linear models, in generalized linear
models the lagged response variable cannot introduce the same covariance matrix as
the autoregressive errors do. Hence, including lagged values of the observed response
variable (the state-dependence specification as often referred to) does not directly
address serially correlated errors, although it can partially control for serial dependence. Moreover, lagged values of the latent response variable should be used with
caution: including lagged values into the structural form have to be justified with
a “causal” interpretation; if the errors are still correlated, including a lagged latent
response variable invites endogeneity; and it often reduces the sample size if the first
P values are treated as exogenous. In TSCS data, the loss is N × P observations
which is not a trivial reduction of the sample size (Wilson and Butler, 2007; Skrondal
and Rabe-Hesketh, 2008). Finally, with all those pitfalls, estimation of generalized
linear models with lagged values of the latent response variable is not necessarily
easier than estimating models with autoregressive error specifications.
With binary (or other categorical) TSCS responses and serially correlated errors,
the major methodological challenges arise in the following three areas: first, the
overall error structure has to be decomposed into three parts, i.e., the unit-level
errors, the time-level errors, and the idiosyncratic (individual-level) errors, and an
appropriate model specification should be able to analyze the three parts at the same
time; second, with the covariance matrix of the idiosyncratic errors not as a diagonal
matrix, the likelihood function is intractable and conventional data augmentation
methods for sampling the latent responses are inefficient; third, the complication
6

caused by correlated errors is further exacerbated by unbalanced data structures
which are common in observational studies. An unbalanced data structure leads to
a complicated covariance matrix, and makes it particularly difficult to simulate the
time-level errors, because widely-employed approaches fail to orthogonalize the errors
in the spatial dimension (Harvey, 1981; Chib, 1993; Mueller and Czado, 2005).
This chapter discusses Bayesian techiniques for analyzing the intertemporal and
contemporal correlation of binary TSCS data. The serial dependence consists of an
everlasting part of unobserved unit heterogeneity and a time-varying part of serially
correlated errors. The spatial dependence results from time-specific common shocks
which can be observed or unobserved. In the current research, I do not consider the
contemporal correlation caused by interactions among the units, which is often analyzed with spatial dynamic regressions (Franzse and Hays, 2007, 2008b,a). Modeling
two-dimensional dynamics at the same time is even more complicated and can be a
further extension of the present model and methods. I temporarily leave it to the
future research. In this chapter, I specify a hierarchical model with pth-order autoregressive errors and two group-level regressions in the time and spatial dimensions. To
estimate the model, I orthognalize the errors by using the Cholesky decomposition
and adding an auxiliary parameter. This approach not only solves the problem of
constructing conditional distributions of the time-specific random-effect parameters,
but also dramatically improves simulation efficiency for the following reasons: first,
data augmentation is implemented in one block, unlike in the conventional Geweke
method and its modified versions all of which update the augmented data one by one
and conditional on one another (Geweke, 1991, 1996; Sandor and Andras, 2004); second, this method simplifies the Bayes Factor computation for model comparison and
lag order determination when applying the marginal likelihood approach (Chib, 1995;
Chib and Jeliazkov, 2001), because the likelihood ordinate can be computed simply
7

by conducting only one reduced run instead of using those computationally expensive
methods such as the GHK method and its variants (Geweke, 1991; Borsch-Supan and
Hajivassiliou, 1993; Keane, 1994a; Chib and Jeliazkov, 2006) or the auxiliary particle
filter (Pitt and Shephard, 1999; Mueller and Czado, 2005; Pang, 2008). Furthermore,
because slow MCMC mixing is often a problem of algorithms using Gibbs samplers for
hierarchical models with complicated random effects (Carlin, 1996; Olsen and Schafer,
2001), I further improve simulation efficiency and speed up mixing by implementing
the parameter expansion method, i.e., the partial group move multigrid Monte Carlo
(PGM-MGMC) introduced by Liu and Wu (1999) and Liu and Sabatti (2000).
The model and techniques are espeically useful for investigating dynamics and
common shocks by using TSCS data. In political science, path dependence or political inertia is a salient political phenomenon and has strong explanatory power for
the evolution of political institutions and events (Thelen, 1999; Pierson and Skocpol,
2002; Peters, Pierre and King, 2005). This dependence or inertia is caused by many
unobserved as well as observed factors. Modeling error correlation not only improves
reliability of statistical inferences, but also helps explain sub rosa political dynamics.
Likewise, contemporary correlation is substantively important for political economists
who share the consensus regarding great impacts of globalization on almost all significant political economic phenomena. Heterogeneity, if omitted but correlated with
the responses, is a cause of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, but it is also
theoretically interesting, especially to comparativists, when the data contain a small
or moderate number of identifiable and theoretically interesting units, such as countries, states, or legislators. Appropriately modeling heterogeneity helps the researcher
reach generalizable but not over-generalized conclusions. Analyzing heterogeneity
across time as well as among units is also essential for correctly understanding dynamics, since ignoring heterogeneity leads to “spurious dynamics” wherein temporal
8

pseudodependence is simply caused by unmodeled differences among units instead
of dynamics (Heckman, 1981). This model is also useful for studies with statistical
forecasting (building early-warning systems) as one of the major tasks, such as the
research on state failure, financial crises, and international investment risk. The proposed model improves statistical predicting by making good use of the information
contained in errors which is neglected in conventional models most of the time.

2.2

Model Specification and Assumptions

Suppose the data consist of N units indexed as i, where i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }. Each unit
i has Ti observations across the time periods {1i , ..., ti , ..., Ti } ⊆ {1, 2, ..., T }. With
the contemporary effects modeled, the value of ti indexes the observation’s location
in the sequence of {1, 2, ..., T }, i.e., the time-dimension cluster it belongs to. For
unbalanced data structures, it is likely that ti 6= tj and Ti 6= Tj for i 6= j. Therefore,
in the model there are two sources of clustering: an observation belongs to cluster
i and ti at the same time, and the two clusters are not nested. By using the latent
variable specification (Albert and Chib, 1993), the generalized linear multi-level model
for binary TSCS responses with errors following a pth-order autoregressive process
(henceforth, GLMM-AR(p)) can be written as follows:

yi,ti = I(zi,ti > 0),

(2.1)

0
β + s0i,ti β 3ti + ξi,ti ,
zi,ti = x01i,ti β 1 + wi,t
i 2i

(2.2)

β 2i = A iβ 2 + b i ,

(2.3)

β 3ti = F ti β 3 + c ti ,

(2.4)

ξi,ti = ρ1 ξi,ti −1 + ... + ρp ξi,ti −p + ui,ti ,

(2.5)

9

where I(·) is the indicator function. This specification is an extension of the commonlyapplied generalized linear mixed-effect model in longitudinal analysis. In this model,
yi,ti is the observation of unit i at time ti , and whether it takes value of 0 or 1 is
determined by a latent continuous variable zi,ti and a threshold 0. At the latent
level, zi,ti is assumed to have a linear relationship with the specified covariates (equation (4.7)), and the error ξi,ti follows an AR(p) process (equation (4.9)). Although
non-Toeplitz errors2 can be applied, the simple AR(p) error specification should be
adequate for analyzing serial correlation of equally spaced TSCS observations. It can
also serve as a serial correlation diagnosis following the classical Box-Jenkins procedure: run models with different lag orders and use information-based criteria to
choose an appropriate one (Box, Jenskins and Reinsel, 1994). In addition, this error
specification does not impose any theoretical or mathematical limitations on the lag
order choice or including LDVs/LIDVs. Since LDVs/LIDVs in the model do not lead
to any additional methodological issue and can be easily included in any of the design
matrices in equation (4.7) as ordinary regressors if we are willing to use them, I do
not make them as special terms in the model and will not discuss them as special
specifications. In this general specification, there are three groups of covariates: those
in x 1i,ti with fixed effects on all the observations, and those in w i,ti or s i,ti with unitspecific or time-specific effects (random effects. The model can have time-varing and
unit-varing random intercepts, but for identification reasons, a constant should not
be included in x 1i,ti at the same time, and when there are two random intercepts, the
unit-specific one is centered at 0. At the unit level (equation (2.3)), heterogeneity
across units is modeled; another set of covariates a i in matrix A i , parameters β 2 , and
an error term b i , together explain the variation of the random effects β 2i . The same
2

A Toeplitz matrix is also known as a diagonal-constant matrix, which is a matrix with constant
descending diagonals from left to right. The AR(p) and MA(q) covariance matrice are both Toeplitz.

10

specification applies to the time-dimension clustering in equation (2.4). To estimate
0
the model, I construct its reduced form by setting xi,ti = (x1,iti , wi,t
A i , s0i,ti F ti ) and
i

β 1 , β 2 , β 3 ), which can be written as follows:
β = (β
0
b + s0i,ti cti + ξi,ti
zi,ti = x0i,ti β + wi,t
i i

(2.6)

ξi,ti = ρ1 ξi,ti −1 + ... + ρp ξi,ti −p + ui,ti .

(2.7)

The reduced form clearly demonstrates the many possibilities for the error structure:
, if assuming {bbi } and {cct } are not correlated, the error structure is can be expressed
as Σ Zi = W 0iΣ bi W i + TiS 0iΣcTi S i + Σ ξi 3 . In this equation, Σ Zi , Σ bi , Σ cTi , and Σ ξi , are
the covariance matrices of Z i , {bbi }, {ccTi }, and ξ i , respectively. It is important to note
that the covariance matrix Σ Zi not only reflect correlation of the responses, but also
contains heteroskedasticity.
Several assumptions are made for identification and estimation reasons: (1) the error term ui,ti in the autoregressive process is white noise, that is ui,ti ∼ N (0, 1); (2) the
individual-level errors are not correlated across units; mathematically, cov(ξi,ti , ξk,ts ) =
0, ∀i 6= k and ∀ti , ts ∈ T ; (3) the error ξ follows a pth-order autoregressive process;
(4) if the data structure is unbalanced, it is only for exogenous reasons. In other
words, there is no sample selection problem; (5) the covariates in x i,ti and w i,ti are
sequentially exogenous (compared to the strict exogeneity assumption commonly rew i,ti ⊥ ξi,ti )|zi,tsi and (x
xi,ti ⊥ ξi,ti )|zi,tsi , ∀tsi ≤ ti ; (6)
quired in panel data analysis): (w
the autoregressive process is stationary. The stationarity assumption is restrictive
and requires that either the dynamic process under investigation is stationary or a
non-stationary process of Z i is cointegrated with the explanatory variables included
3
For model specification and estimation, this assumption is not necessary. The assumption used
here is only for obtaining in a easily-written mathematical form to illustrate the error structure.
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in xi , wi and si (Chib and Greenberg, 1994); otherwise, the model cannot be applied4 . In fact, this assumption makes the GLMM-AR(p) an informal panel data unit
root and cointegration test following the line of the residual-based tests (Engle and
Granger, 1987; Kao, 1999; Pedroni, 1999, 2004), which is valuable for avoiding spurious regressions (Hamilton, 1994, pp.557-62). This is particularly important since
in the literature conducting formal cointegration tests on discrete panel data is challenging, and this type of statistical tests are rarely done on discrete panel data (or
longitudinal data) in practice. Later in this chapter, I will use an empirical example
to illustrate how the GLMM-AR(p) model with a stationarity restriction on the error
process, serves as a tool to detect likely spurious relationships between the response
and explanatory variables; (7) finally, I assign priors on the parameters as follows:

β 0 , B0 ),
β ∼ NK1 (β
{cct } ∼ NK3 (00, E ),

uit ∼ N (0, 1),

{bbi } ∼ NK2 (00, D ),

E −1 ∼ WK3 (ηη 0 , E 0 ),

D −1 ∼ WK2 (νν 0 , D 0 ),

ρ ∼ Up (ρρ : ρ ∈ Sρ ),

where Sρ is the stationarity space of the autoregressive coefficients5 . Since uit , {bbi },
and {cct } are errors at different levels, their prior means are set to be 0. However,
centering the prior mean of {cct } at zero is not required for mathematical reasons in the
designed MCMC algorithm, which means that the time-level intercept can be omitted
in the specification because it can be automatically included in the non-centered
posteriors of {cct }. All the parameters except ρ have conditional conjugate priors.
4

The MCMC algorithm will provide information about non-stationarity by not being able to
generate or accept legitimate proposals (proposals drawn within the stationary space) for the autoregressive coefficients, and the MCMC simulation process will halt if the chain is stuck with keeping
drawing illegitimate proposals in a pre-specified period of time.
5

An AR process is stationary if all the characteristic roots of the polynomial are outside the unit
circle. For different autoregressive processes the stationarity space is different.

12

Other prior specifications are possible; for instance, the autoregressive coefficients
ρ could have a multivariate normal prior distribution truncated in the stationarity
space, but the priors of b i and u by design should be centered at 0 . I use diffuse but
proper priors, and conduct simulations on the prior distributions to ensure they are
in reasonable spaces for the substantive questions.

2.3

MCMC Algorithm

2.3.1

Cholesky Decomposition and Auxiliary Variable

Due to the serially correlated errors, the covariance matrix have non-zero offdiagonal elements, which complicates model estimation of the proposed setup. One
way to handle this challenge is to use so-called robust standard errors. However,
this method is not as convenient as it seems, because three biases6 have to be overcome when constructing the weight function (Andrews, 1991; Lumley and Heagerty,
1999; Zeileis, 2004), which is difficult for non-linear mixed-effect models. More importantly, using robust standard errors discards valuable information in the error
term. Such information could have been used for analyzing dynamics and heterogeneity and for improving forecasts. Other solutions having been developed in the
literature include estimating generalized multilevel models with serial correlation by
using numerical methods such as Penalized Quasi-Likelihood (PQL), Marginal QuasiLikelihood (MQL) or EM algorithms (Schafer and Yucel, 2002; Renard, Molenberghs
and Geys, 2004; Molenberghs and Verbeke, 2005, Chapter 14 and Chapter 22). However, those methods are complicated with many approximation steps such as linear
6

The three biases are the bias of the estimator of the variance, bias due to omitted and downweighted correlations (truncation bias), and bias caused by evaluating the estimator at estimates
rather than the true parameters (centering bias).
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or high-order Taylor expansion, Gauss-Hermite quadrature, pseudo-data generation,
or empirical Bayes estimation. What is even worse is that these procedures often
yield estimates and standard errors biased towards zero, especially with the firstorder expansion (Ng et al., 2006). The Bayesian approach has been widely used for
analyzing multilevel models and enjoys the flexibility in specifying and estimating rich
and sophisticated models (Hagenaars, 1990; Singer and Willett, 2003; Yang, Fu and
Land, 2004; Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004; Molenberghs and Verbeke, 2005), but,
even the Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods encounter at least two methodological
challenges in estimating the GLMM-AR(p) model.
First, the non-zero off-diagonal elements in the covariance matrix Σ ξi complicate
constructing the conditional distribution of the time-specific random effect parameter vector {cct }. This is because when developing its conditional distribution for
constructing the Markov chain, we have to switch to the spatial dimension, and express equation (4.10) as follows:




z 1 = x 1β + w 1b N1 + s 1c 1 + 1







z 2 = x2β + w 2bN2 + s2c2 + 2

(2.8)




... ... ...







z T = x T β + w T b NT + s T c T + T
This is a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system, and the errors in the T
equations are correlated because of serial dependence. The covariance matrix is
X, w, ss) = Σ ⊗ I T for a balanced dataset, and more complicated if Nt 6= Nk for
Var(|X,
some t 6= k. Handling unbalanced structure is not easy in SUR analysis (McDowell,
2004; Schmidt, 1977). In the Bayesian framework, although it is feasible to specify
X, w, ss) with unbalanced structure since Σ i is a Toeplitz
the covariance matrix Var(|X,
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matrix, it is computational expensive to compute a M × M matrix (M =

PT

t=1

Nt )

in each iteration by decomposing Toeplitz matrices and then mapping the elements
into a huge covariance matrix.
Second, the Toeplitz error matrix requires sampling from truncated multivariate
normal distributions for data augmentation (sampling {zz i }). In the literature, various
approaches have been proposed, such as quasi Monte Carlo, antithetic Monte Carlo,
and samples based on orthogonal arrays (Sandor and Andras, 2004). The method,
introduced by Geweke (1991, 1996) and widely used in applied works, is to apply
the Gibbs sampler to update the latent responses, ziti , one by one, conditional on
other zi,−ti s, which is not efficient and often mixes poorly (Rodriguez-Yam, Davis
and Scharf, 2004). In addition to the slow mixing problem, applying this method
makes it difficult to compute the Bayes Factor, as the likelihood ordinate in the
marginal likelihood contains the latent variable z :
Z
L = f (yit1i , ..., yitJi |θθ ) =

bi1i

Z

bi2i

Z

biTi

...
ai1i

ai2i

aiTi

p(zit1i , ..., zitJi |θθ )dzit1i ...dzitTi ,

(2.9)

where (aiti , biti ) is the truncated region determined by yiti , and θ represents all the
parameters in the model. Note that z i cannot be averaged out by using the MCMC
output, since the samples of z are not drawn from the its marginal distribution (without conditional on y ) to which this integration is with respect. Instead, the draws
are from the distribution conditional on y , and cannot be used to average z out. One
solution is the GHK simulator (Geweke, 1991; Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou, 1993;
Keane, 1994b; Chib and Jeliazkov, 2006), which is computationally expensive, especially with a large dataset. Alternatively, the likelihood ordinate can be estimated
by using the auxiliary particle filter, when the latent response variable is sampled by
transforming data with polynomial operator P (L)ziti to orthogonalize the covariance
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matrix (Mueller and Czado, 2005; Pang, 2008). However, this SIR-based sampling
scheme is not stable for a high order Markov process and often requires a huge number
of samples in each iteration to obtain a valid approximation of the likelihood.
I propose an algorithm which orthogonalizes the correlated errors in such a way
that zit can be sampled without being conditional on any other zs, and all z updated in
P
one block instead of N
i=1 Ti blocks, which improves simulation efficiency dramatically.
Importantly, this method makes computation of the likelihood ordinate in marginal
likelihood calculation as simple as in an ordinary probit model. It also takes care
of the off-diagonal elements in the Toeplitz covariance matrix of the errors when
constructing the conditional distribution of {cct }. The basic idea is as follows: first,
we can decompose the covariance matrix Σξ i into two parts Σξ i = Ω i +κiI i , where Ω i is
a symmetric positive definite matrix and κi is any constant (I choose %i /2 for κi , where
%i is the smallest eigenvalue of Ω i . This choice follows Chib and Jeliazkov (2006) and
is to make the algorithm numerically stable); and Ω i is further decomposed as V 0iV i ,
in which V 0i is the lower triangular matrix produced by the Cholesky decomposition.
Hence, I can re-express the covariance matrix as Σxi i = V 0iV i + κiI T , and the model
in equation (4.10) can be written as

z i = x0iβ + wi0 b i + s0ic Ti + V 0iu i +  i ,

(2.10)

where the new error term  i ∼ NTi (0, κiI Ti ) and the auxiliary variable u i ∼ NTi (00, I Ti ),
and they are mutually independent. Since in the Bayesian approach we marginalize
a parameter with respect to its prior distribution, in equation (2.10) z i has the exact
Vi is a
covariance matrix Σξ i when integrating u i out. Conditional on u i and ρ (V
function of ρ ) as well as other parameters, the elements in z i are not correlated and
do not need to be updated conditional on one another. Furthermore, there are general
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formulas to compute the Toeplitz covariance matrix Σξ i for AR(p) errors, and we even
do not need to compute each Σξ i ; instead, in each iteration I simply compute Σ T ×T
(T is the maximum number of time periods) and construct the covariance matrix Σξ i
for each i by taking the first Ti rows and columns of Σ T ×T . Define (q1 , q2 , ..., qTi ) =
q i ≡ V 0iu i and the algorithm is simplified as follows:
ui }|· ∼ π({u
ui }|β
β , {bbi }, ·)π({bbi |β
β , ·)π(β
β |·)7
1. β , {bbi }, {u
PN 0 −1 −1
β , B 1 ), where B 1 = (B
B −1
• β |· ∼ NK1 (β̄
,
0 +
i=1 x iH i x i )


P
N
0 −1 z
0
β = B 1 B −1
Ωi + w 0iDw i );
β̄
i − sic Ti ) , and H i = (Ω
0 β0 +
i=1 x iH i (z
β , · ∼ NK2 (b̄bi , D 1i ), where D 1i = (D
D −1 + w 0i (Ω
Ωi )−1w i )−1 and b̄bi = D 1iw 0i (Ω
Ωi )−1 (zz i −
• b i |β
x0iβ − s0ic Ti );
ui , U i ), where U i = (II T +V
V iV 0i /κi )−1 , and ū
ui = U iV i (zz i −x
x0iβ −w
w 0ib i −s0ic Ti )/κi
• u i |· ∼ N (ū
E −1 + s 0i (κ
κNt I N )−1s i )−1 and c̄ct = E 1is 0i (κ
κNt I N )−1 (zz i −
2. {cct }|· ∼ NK3 (c̄ct , E 1i ), where E 1i = (E
x0iβ − s0tb Nt − qt ), where κ Nt is the vector with κi ’s for all the i’s observed at time t
0
3. zit |· ∼ T N (x0itβ + wit
b i + s0itc ti + qit , κi )

D −1
4. D −1 |· ∼ WK2 (ν1 , D 1 ) and E −1 |{cct } ∼ WK3 (η1 , E 1 ) , where ν1 = ν0 + N , D 1 = (D
0 +
PN
P
T
0 −1
0 −1
E −1
, η1 = η0 + T , and E 1 = (E
0 +
i=1 b ib i )
i=1 c tc t )
5. ρ |· ∼ Ψ(ρρ) × N (ρ̂ρ, P ), following Chib (1993), I use a Metropolis-Hasting algorithm to update
ρ by using the tailored kernel N (ρ̂ρ, P ).

Chib and Jeliazkov (2006) proposed the Cholesky decompostion idea for sampling
the nonparametric term in their binary panel model, but they still applied the Geweke
method to sample zi,ti conditional on other zs, which is much less efficient than
the algorithm applied here. More important, the algorithm above makes marginal
likelihood calculation straightforward which is shown in the next section.
7

ui } in one block improves the efficiency of this algorithm because they
Sampling β , {bbi } and {u
are correlated by construction. However, it is not feasible to include {cct } in this block because of
the complicated covariance structure caused by marginalization.
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2.3.2

Partial Group Move Multigrid Monte Carlo

MCMC algorithms using Gibbs samplers can mix slowly and take a long time for
the Markov chain to explore the stationary space (Carlin, 1996; Olsen and Schafer,
2001). With random effects in two dimensions and serially correlated errors, the
preliminary simulations I have conducted by implementing the algorithm above justify
the concern of slow mixing. To further improve simulation efficiency and speed up
mixing, I add a partial group move Multigrid Monte Carlo (PGM-MGMC) updating
stage into the algorithm, which dramatically reduces within-chain autocorrelation.
The basic idea of multigrid methods is to use a sequence of auxiliary “coarse-grid”
problems in addition to the original “fine-grid” problem so that the information is
more efficiently stored and convergence is accelerated (Goodman and Sokal, 1989;
Briggs, 1987, Chap.3). This method was first applied in statistical physics and Euclidean quantum physics. Goodman and Sokal (1989) extended the deterministic
multigrid method into a multigrid Monte Carlo algorithm by applying partial resampling and fiber construction. Liu and Sabatti (2000) generalized the Gibbs sampler
by using the multigrid Monte Carlo method to decompose the sample space into
disjoint orbits8 in order to facilitate information transmission. By generating a transformation group, the Markov chain is moved by a mover from one orbit to another
without leaving the sample space of the target distribution (Liu and Wu, 1999). This
enables a faster exploration of the sample space and achieves the effects of reparameterization, blocking, or grouping, but has more freedom of decomposing the sample
space. They applied this method to state space models and showed that, by choosing
a transformation group, the move can be dramatic and autocorrelation reduced to a
8

In the group theory, define a goup G and a set X, an orbit of x ∈ X is the set S ⊂ X to which
x can be moved by the elements of G. Disjoint orbits simply means that the orbits S1 , S2 , ... are
disjoint. Refer to Bogopolski (2008) or Aschbacher (2000) for more formally definitions and detailed
theories about orbits.

18

considerable degree. Mueller and Czado (2005) also applied the partial move group
multigrid Monte Carlo method to reduce autocorrelation in their autoregressive ordinal probit model, and demonstrated the efficiency of this method by speeding up
mixing. The posterior distribution of the GLMM-AR(p) setup facilitates developing
a distribution from which a mover can be randomly drawn to transform a subset of
m parameters ω ≡ ({zz i }, β , {bb}, {cc}). To apply a partial group move multigrid MC, I
choose the scale group Γ = {χ > 0 : χ(x) = χx} and calculate the unimodular Haar
measure as L(dχ) = χ−1 dχ, which, together with the posterior distribution, directly
implies a standard gamma distribution as the mover distribution:
N

1X
β − wi χbbi − χcc)0Ω −1
z i − xi χβ
β − wi χbbi − χcc
(χzz i − xi χβ
i (χz
2
i=1
!
N
T
1 X 0 −1
1 X 0 −1
1
0 −1
β ) exp(−
β ) B0 (χβ
× exp − (χβ
χbbiD χbbi ) exp −
χcctE χcct
2
2
2

ω )dχ ∝χm−1 exp −
χm−1 π(χω

t−1

i=1

N
 1
X
z i − xiβ − wib i − sic Ti )
∝χm−1 exp − χ2
(zz i − xiβ − wib i − sic Ti )0Ω −1
i (z
2
{z
}
|i=1
Q1

+ β 0 B−1
0 β +

N
X

b 0iD −1b i +


c 0tE −1c t )

t=1

i=1

|

T
X

{z

}

Q2

 1

∝χm−1 exp − χ2 Q1 + Q2 ) .
2

(2.11)

This kernel is proportional to a gamma distribution Γ(a, b) for χ2 with parameters
a = (m + 1)/2 and b = (Q1 + Q2 )/2. I apply this PGM-MGMC as an updating
(g)
(g)
β (g) → β (g) ,
stage in each iteration in the MCMC algorithm: {χzz i } → {zz i }, χβ
(g)
(g)
(g)
(g)
{χbbi } → {bbi }, and {χcct } → {cct }.
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2.4

Bayesian Model Comparison

Because we always have uncertainty in almost all respects of model specification,
implementing information-based criteria for model decision-making is necessary and
important (Gill, 2007). In this particular case, among other considerations, we normally have very limited prior information about the order of the autoregressive error
process. In the time series literature on linear regressions, lag orders are decided
by running models with different lag orders, and the appropriate order is decided
by applying information-based criteria. The same procedure has not commonly performed for non-linear models, and lag orders are often decided for convenience (most
often the first order). In the Bayesian framework, the Bayes Factor as a criterion of
decision making has many advantages, but at the same time, is known as computationally expensive and sometimes numerically unstable, especially for sophisticated
models with high dimensionality (Han and Carlin, 2001). With correlated errors and
the latent dependent responses as a multivariate normal distribution, approximating
the likelihood often requires additional samplers, such as importance samplers (Chib
and Jeliazkov, 2006) or recursive importance samplers (Mueller and Czado, 2005).
By using the auxiliary parameter approach presented in the previous section, the
Bayes Factor can be computed by only using full or reduced MCMC outputs. This
section gives the algorithm to estimate the Bayes Factor for model comparison and,
especially, lag order determination.
The Bayes Factor is simply defined as the ratio of two marginal likelihoods (Greenberg, 2007, p.34). There are various approaches to approximae this quantity (Han
and Carlin, 2001), and I apply the marginal likelihood method (Chib, 1995; Chib and
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Jeliazkov, 2001). The Marginal likelihood is the normalizing constant in the Bayesian
setup, and can be expressed as follows:

m(y) =

f (y|θ)π(θ)
.
π(θ|y)

(2.12)

Adopting the approach developed by Chib (1995) and Chib and Jeliazkov (2001), I fix
the values of θ, and the marginal likelihood on the logarithm scale can be computed
by using the formula:

ln m̂(y) = ln fˆ(y|θ∗ ) + ln π̂(θ∗ ) − ln π̂(θ∗ |y).

(2.13)

By using the Cholesky-decomposition-auxiliary-parameter approach, the likelihood ordinate, fˆ(y|θ∗ ), is straightforward to compute. Denote θ as all the parameters
except the auxiliary variable u , and the likelihood ordinate can be approximated by
fixing the values at θ ∗ and integrating out u which is a function of q and also related
to κ:

M N Ti
1 XYY
∗
ˆ
(∆iti )yiti (1 − ∆iti )1−yiti ,
f (yy |θθ ) =
M m=1 i=1 t =1
i


(m)
∗
0 ∗
0
∗
0
xit β + witi b i + sic ti + qiti

q
where, ∆iti = Φ  i
(m)
κi

(2.14)

(2.15)

u|θθ ∗ , z ), a
Because I integrate u out with respect to the conditional distribution of π(u
u, θ ∗ .
reduced run is required, which is u |zz , θ ∗ and z |u
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To approximate the posterior ordinate π̂(θθ ∗ |y), I partition it in the following way:

β ∗ , b ∗ , D ∗ , ρ ∗ , E ∗ , u ∗ |yy ) = π̂(ρρ∗ |yy )π̂(cc∗ |, ρ ∗ , y )π̂(E
E ∗ |cc∗ , ρ ∗ , y )π̂(bb∗ |E
E ∗, c∗, ρ∗, y )
π̂(β
D ∗ |bb∗ , E ∗ , c ∗ , ρ ∗ , y )π̂(β
β ∗ |D
D ∗ , b ∗ , E ∗ , c ∗ , ρ ∗ , y ),
× π̂(D

(2.16)

and compute each term on the right hand side above in the order from the left to the
right:
1. π̂(ρρ∗ |yy ): denote ψ as all parameters except ρ and u :

π̂(ρρ∗ |yy ) =

J −1

PN 
i=1


α(ρρ(j) , ρ ∗ |yy , ψ (j) , u (j) , z (j) )q(ρρ(j) , ρ ∗ |yy , ψ (j) , u (j) , z (j) )

.
P 
∗ , ρ (k) |y
(k) , u (k) , z (k) )
ρ
y
K −1 K
α(ρ
,
ψ
k=1
(2.17)

ψ , u , z |yy ) and the
The numerator is the sample expectation with respect to π(ψ
MCMC output can be directly used to integrate those parameters in the conditional part. The denominator is the sample expectation with respect to the
ψ , u , z |yy )q(ρρ∗ , ρ |yy , ψ , u , z ). Here, one reduced
conditional product measure π(ψ
run is needed: fixed ρ at ρ ∗ , conduct a reduce run to get ψ and ρ (k) in each
iteration by using ψ (k) , and then plug all those draws of the parameters and
augmented data into the denominator, and compute the quantity;
2. π̂(cc∗ |, ρ ∗ , y ): directly use the output of the reduced run conducted above;
E ∗ |cc∗ , ρ ∗ , z , y ) = π̂(E
E ∗ |cc∗ , y ): no reduced run required;
3. π̂(E
E ∗, c∗, ρ∗, y ) =
4. π̂(bb∗ |E

QN

i=1

π̂(bb∗i |cc∗ , ρ ∗ , z i , y i ): conduct a reduced run by fixing

E , c , ρ , and keep the output of β , D , z together with the fixed values to compute
this quantity;
22

D ∗ |bb∗ , E ∗ , c ∗ , ρ ∗ , y ) = π̂(D
D ∗ |bb∗ , y ): no reduced run needed;
5. π̂(D
β ∗ |D
D ∗ , b ∗ , E ∗ , c ∗ , ρ ∗ , y ) = π̂(β
β ∗ |bb∗ , c ∗ , ρ ∗ , z , y ): conduct a reduced run by fixing
6. π̂(β
D , b , E , c , ρ and keep the output of z together with the fixed values of b ∗ , c ∗ , ρ ∗
to compute this quantity.

2.5

Simulation Study

I exam the performance of the model and estimation techiniques developed in the
previous sections with Monte Carlo experiments. The simulations reported in this
section are desgined as the following: first, two datasets are generated by roughly the
same data-generating process (DGP) but with different autoregressive coefficients
(ρ1 = 0.7, ρ2 = 0.2 for the first dataset, and ρ1 = −0.5, ρ2 = −0.3 for the second)9 ;
second, in both datasets, the number of observations is 2187 and the data structures
are unbalanced with the number of observations of a unit varying from 2 to 50 and
the number of observations in a time period from 8 to 50; third, both DGPs have a
mixed-effect design: 5 covariates have fixed effects (in x i ), 5 have unit-specific random
effects (in w i ), and 2 have time-specific effects (in s i ). At the group levels, there are
3 unit-level predictors (in a i ) and 2 time-level predictors (in f t ).
I assign diffuse priors to the parameters. For the auxiliary parameter vector,
u i , its prior be NTi (00, I Ti ) by design. The prior choice is also straightforward for the
group-level errors {bbi } and {cct }: as residuals, their distributions are centered at 0 , and
their covariance matrices are treated as hyperparameters. The coefficient parameter
vector β is assigned with a multivariate normal prior centered at 0 , having a diagonal
9

Chib and Jeliazkov (2006) find that in hierarchical models with serially correlated errors, negative
autocorrelation seems to be identified better than positive autocorrelation. I use the two comparable
datasets to check this point
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covariance matrix with all diagonal elements equal to 400. This prior is vague, and
the inverse of the prior covariance matrix has all diagonal elements as small as 0.0025,
which should not have notable effects on the posteriors. Note that for implementing
the PGM-MGMC algorithm, the priors on β have to be centered at 0 . The prior on the
autoregressive parameter vector ρ p is a multidimensional uniform distribution within
the stationary space. For the hyperparameter matrices D and E , their priors can
have dramatic influence on their posteriors for two reasons: they are at the lowest
level of the hierarchy, and binary data often have very limited information about
them. However, too diffuse priors such as D = diag(100) are likely to cause trouble
in inverting matrices in the Wishart updating and result in numerical instability. My
experience from many trials suggests that priors around D = diag(20) (also for E )
are good choices for balancing prior influence and numerical stability. The sensitivity
of posteriors to the prior choices has been checked by using alternative priors with
reasonable changes of locations and scales.
As observed by Carlin (1996) and Olsen and Schafer (2001), the slow MCMC
mixing problem for non-linear mixed effect models by using the Gibbs sampler (the
MH algorithm in the present algorithm is only for one block) is serious even with
data augmentation conducted in one block in the algorithm proposed in the present
research. In Figure 2.1, the grey shadow indicates the autocorrelation of a randomly
selected fixed-effect parameter chain, a random-effect parameter chain in b i , and a
parameter chain in the covariance matrix E (the order is from the left panel to
the right). For fixed-effect parameters, the standard Gibbs Markov chains mix not
badly at all, but for the random-effect parameters and the ones at low levels in the
hierarchy, within-chain autocorrelation decreases very slowly—even after 150 lags,
it is still as high as about 0.5, indicating ineffeciency of the algorithm. This slowlydecaying autocorrelations can result in the infeasibility for implementing the methods
24
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Figure 2.1: Comparison of Wihtin-Chain Autocorrelation: Gibbs vs. Gibbs+PGMMGMC
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practically to models with more parameters. By using the PGM-MGMC mover, the
mixing is dramatically improved, especially for those slowly-mixing parameters (see
the blue shadow in Figure 2.1). There is an observable reduction of the mixing time
for the fixed-effect parameters, but the improvement is not as dramatic as for the
random-effect and low-level parameters. Even with the PGM-MGMC updating, the
overall mixing time is much longer than in simple Bayesian models. Considering that
this is a sophisticated nonlinear hierarchical model with more than 5,000 parameters,
this is not surprising and the MCMC mixing time of the current algorithm can be
regarded as satisfactory.
I estimate models with increasing lag orders—if it turns out that a higher order
makes the model fit the data better, I increase the lag order further until the marginal
likelihood starts to decrease. This procedure illustrates the model with the computed
marginal likelihood can serve as a serial correlation diagnosis for binary TSCS data.
It is much easier to apply than the score test proposed by Gourieroux, Monfort and
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Trongnon (1985), especially for a higher-order autocorrelation diagnosis. Based on
the Bayes Factors, for DGP I with positive serial correlation, the GLMM-AR(3) is
the best among the five models with the lag order from 0 to 4, while for DGP II (negative serial correlation), the GLMM-AR(2) has the best goodness-of-fit among the
competing specifications. In the MH step, because the proposal density is tailored,
the acceptance rates are roughly between 75% and 90% in all relevant models. The
MCMC outputs analyzed in this section are based on 500,000 iterations after discarding 50,000 burn-in iterations for each model. Multiple convergence diagnostics
have been conducted for all parameters except the augmented data and the auxiliary
parameters. For the latter two, because there are too many of them (2178× 2), I
randomly drew 100 of each and conducted diagnostics on them.
The posteriors of all fixed-effect parameters and selected random-effect parameters
are summarized in Figure 2.2. As discussed in the time series literature, due to
falsely assuming serially independent errors, estimators of standard errors are biased
(Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognon, 1984; Poirier and Ruud, 1988). In addition, with
the probit link and its standard identification assumption (i.e., the unit variance of the
latent errors), parameters are estimated with their scales adjusted by a function of the
actual standard deviation of the errors. However, the standard deviation is not 1 with
the presence of serial correlation, but the parameters will be mistakenly interpreted
as if it were. For the two reasons, the GLMM-AR(0) models for both of the DGPs
produce estimates with notably smaller scales (moving towards 0) and artificially
higher levels of certainty (the error bands are smaller). This biasedness also exists
for the random coefficients at the two group levels, as is illustrated in Figure 4.12.
There is no clear evidence that negative autocorrelation is easier to identify—they
are all estimated correctly in terms of directions, although the scales are not precisely
estimated. With a larger number of time periods or units or both, the autoregressive
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Figure 2.2: Posteriors of GLMM with Different Lag Order
DGPII: ρ1 = −0.5, ρ2 = −0.3

DGP I: ρ1 = 0.7, ρ2 = 0.2
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The true values of the paremeters presented in the graphs are as the following: Fixed1=2, Fixed-2=−4, Fixed-3=0, Fixed-4=4, β2,11 = 0.5, β2,12 = 1, β2,13 = −2, β2,51 = 3,
‘β2,52 = −4, β2,53 = 0, β3,11 = −3, β3,12 = 0.2, β3,21 = 2, β22 = 1.
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coefficients are estimated better, but there is still no evidence suggesting the difference
between positive or negative correlation in terms of autocorrelation estimation. In
Figure 2.2, the posteriors after serial correlation correction all cover true values, and
are very similar cross the models with p > 0. Although the true parameters are
exactly the same in the two datasets except the serial correlation, differences in the
posteriors based on the two datasets are observed. However, those differences may not
be caused by the different directions of serial correlation; there is always randomness
in the data generation, and the degree of informativeness of two datasets generated
even by the same DGP cannot be the same.
The simulation designs put much heterogeneity in both the time and unit dimensions: the random effects β 2i and β 3t are generated from distributions centered at zero
with large variances. Figure 4.12 shows that the averages of the random effects in
both dimensions are correctly estimated as around 0. For most clusters, the random
effects are statistically different from zero (either positive or negative with a 95%
credibility level). Without modeling heterogeneity, especially in the time dimension
that is ignored most of the time in the literature, inferences based on the estimates
are misleading or overgeneralized. The graphs also demonstrate that correcting serial correlation is important for better identifying heterogeneity. Neglecting serial
correlation results in smaller error bands of the random-effect parameters which are
measuring heterogeneity.
Other parameters such as the covariance matrices of b i and c t are not estimated
as precisely as the higher-level parameters and more sensitive to prior specifications.
However, the estimated correlation parameters are close to the true values with the
priors used in the simulations. Furthermore, increasing the number of units helps
better estimate D and decreases its sensitivity to prior specification. Similarly, more
time periods allows E to be identified more precisely.
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2.6

Empirical Demonstrations

I use two empirical examples to illustrate how the proposed model and methods
can improve reliability of statistical inferences and forecasts in discrete TSCS data
analysis. Both examples are about political instability in the sub-Saharan countries:
the first studies state failure generally and the second focuses on a particular kind of
state failure, civil war. The state failure example shows that by controlling for multiple sources of confounding and making good use of information in the error term,
the proposed model fits the data much better than conventional models and dramatically improves within-sample forecasts. The civil war example is used to highlight
the danger of ignoring serial correlation diagnosis in TSCS data analysis—spurious
regressions when the dynamic process is not stationary or the included regressors fail
to cointegrate with the response variable. The GLMM-AR(p) model can serve as a
cointegration test because it requires the stationary error process to be stationary,
which means that in the model either z i is stationary or it is cointegrated with the
included regressors. In the example, the pooled model finds several “important” explanatory variables, which is unreliable because of the suspected nonstationarity. In
the GLMM-AR(p) model, the autoregressive coefficients have the tendency of going
out of the stationary space and the MCMC process is terminated when no proposals
outside the unit circle can be drawn or accepted.

2.6.1

State Failure in the Sub-Saharan Africa

Since 1994, the Political Instability Task Force (PITF) has been working on detecting important factors which affect state failure risk and building a two-year-ahead
early-warning system for the purpose of providing valuable information for policy
making. The researchers in the PITF project have built a huge database including
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all the independent states with population of at least 500,000 since 1955 and collected data on 1,200 variables (see the published four comprehensive resports, Phase
I Findings to Phase IV Findings(Gurr, Harff and Marshall, 2009)). One of their
local models focuses on the sub-Saharan countries which are particularly interesting
and important because they experienced most state failures occurring in the sample
years. King and Zeng (2001b) provide a comprehensive critique on the methodology
applied by the PITF for drawing causal inferences and conducting forecasts, and they
also give suggestions on how to improve state failure data analysis. From a different
perspective, I use the sub-Saharan Africa model as an example to illustrate how the
GLMM-AR(p) model improves statistical inferences and forecasts.
First, I impute the missing data10 , and, based on the imputed complete dataset,
there are 40 sub-Saharan countries observed in the dataset during the time period of
1956 to 1995. Because of the missingness in the response variable, the data structure
is not balanced—the minimum number of observations of a country is 3 (Eritrea and
Ethiopia), and the maximum number is 40 (Liberia, South Africa, Switzerland). The
average number of observations of a country is 30.4 with standard deviation as 8.58.
In the spatial dimension, the minimum number of observations in a year is 3 (19561959) , and only in two years there is no country missing (1993, 1994). In average,
30.4 countries are observed in a year with the standard deviation as 11.39. There
are 1214 country-years in total, and 446 state failures are observed. Because the
proportion of events is 36.74%, state failure is not a rare event in the sub-Saharan
region. Case-control resampling (Breslow, 1996; King and Zeng, 2001a,c) does not
10

Bayesian data augmentation is a better method to handle missingness (Gill, 2007), but due to
the very large proportion of missingness in the dataset and more than 2,000 parameters already in
the GLMM-AR(p) model in this application, Bayesian data augmentation for missing data will slow
down the MCMC process greatly; therefore, I use the multiple imputation method to handle the
missingness before the Bayesian MCMC simulation.
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Symbol

failure
demo
partyfrac
partyleg
regundur
calory
gdppc
neighI
neighII
infmort
terror
discrim
enroll
cdemo
trade

Variable

State Failure
Democracy
Party Fractionalization
Party Legitimacy
Regime Durability
Calories per capita (consumed)
GDP per catipa
Neighbors in Conflict
Neighbors in Civil/Ethnic War
Infant Mortality
Political Terror Scale
Political Discrimination
Secondary School Enrollment
Change of Democracy
Trade Openness

0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.12
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.49
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.10

0.42
1.51
0.08
0.77
0.08
0.17
0.57
0.70
0.62
0.29
0.76
0.66
0.01
1.14
0.34

0.58
3.72
2.26
1.32
0.28
0.35
6.90
1.78
1.36
0.99
1.15
0.89
0.03
2.53
0.57

0.39
2.76
0.00
0.82
0.06
0.29
0.54
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.02

0.49
3.38
0.12
1.09
0.19
0.35
1.68
0.98
0.85
0.53
0.84
0.68
0.02
1.08
0.48

Mean

0.58
5.13
0.86
1.53
0.22
0.44
3.61
1.58
1.53
0.73
1.23
0.84
0.02
4.95
0.62

Max

Min

Max

Min

Mean

Within-Year Variation

Within-Country Variation

Table 2.2: Within-Group Variation of Variables: State Failure Study

use all the available information and is not needed or preferred in this case, though
it is used by both PITF and King and Zeng (2001b). In this chapter, I apply TSCS
analysis, instead.
As the PITF and King and Zeng (2001b) do, I lag all the explanatory variables
for two years, not only to avoid simultaneity, but also to use the statistical model
as an early-warning system. Table 2.2 summarizes the within-country and withinyear variances of the variables in the model11 . For the within-country variations,
three variables, regime durability, party fractionalization and male secondary school
enrollment, are moving slowly; and the within-year variations of the included variables
have large variation, suggesting considerable observed heterogeneity among those
countries. Because the variable trade openness is found important by the PITF and
other studies (Beck et al., 2002) but suggested to have an unclear effect by others
(King and Zeng (2001b)), I test whether its effect varies across countries by assigning
it with a random coefficient. I also include a country-specific and year-specific random
intercepts in the model.
The prior assignments in this example are similar to the simulation studies. I
run the GLMM-AR(p) models with p = 0, 1, 2, 3 and compare them with two other
competing models, namely, the completely pooled probit model (PROBIT) and a
generalized linear multilevel model only with the country-level random effects (a random coefficient of trade openness and country-specific intercept), which is denoted as
GLMM-CL1. The PROBIT, GLMM-CL1 and the GLMM-AR(0) model all assume
that the errors are uncorrelated.
11

The variables are chosen from the “candidate” covariates in PITF Phase III Findings(p. 24)
by using stochastic search variable selection method. I include all the variables with posterior
probabilities of being included higher than 0.5.
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Figure 2.4: Mixing Improvement by the PGM-MGMC Updating: State Failure Study
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The PGM-MGMC method reduces within-chain autocorrelations and improve
MCMC mixing dramatically, as is shown in Figure 2.4. The posterior summary
and marginal likelihood of each model are reported in Figure 2.5. Positive correlation of the errors is found with Ê(ρ1 ) = 0.37 based on the GLMM-AR(1) and
Ê(ρ1 ) = 0.27, Ê(ρ2 ) = 0.22 according to the GLMM-AR(2) model, both of which are
with a 95% credible level. The GLMM-AR(3) has a similar posterior of ρ1 to the
GLMM-AR(2), but splits the effect of lag 2 into lag 2 and 3 both of which are with
a low credible level. Ignoring serial correlation and heterogeneities, the probit model
(black lines in the figures) generates estimates on both the means and standard errors different from those with serial correlation correction and heterogeneity control.
It exaggerates the effects of almost all the variables and leads to over-confidence in
their effects. It finds 9 out 13 of the explanatory variables are important with high
certainty, and strangely suggests that higher male secondary school enrollment leads
to higher risk of state failure, which is contradictory to the theories. Controlling for
heterogeneity in one or two dimensions makes 6 out of the 9 “important” variables
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Figure 2.5: Posterior Summary with 95% Credible Interval (Six Models): State Failure Study

based on the simple probit model lose their importance and certainty, which suggests
possible edogeneity caused by the correlation between omitted heterogeneites and
some of the regressors in the regression. Correcting serial correlation in the errors
does not make significant changes in the posteriors compared to the GLMM-CL1
model. Nonetheless, like in the simulation studies, modeling serial correlation leads
to larger error bands for all the variables except partyfrac, the variable of party
fractionalization. Somewhat unlike what is observed in the simulated data studies,
the posterior means of the coefficients in the GLMM-AR(p) models with p > 0 are
not always larger than those in the GLMM-AR(0) or GLMM-CL1 model. Note that
in the simulation studies, the DGPs do not allow the errors to be directly or indirectly
correlated with the regressors, but in this empirical example with all variables lagged
for two time periods, it is likely that the error term is correlated with some of the
regressors through t−2 . However, the correlation must be weak since the posteriors
in the five models are not much different in general. The posteriors in the GLMMAR(p) models with p > 0 are very similar, and the Bayes Factors suggest that the
GLMM-AR(2) model is the best one, slightly better than the GLMM-AR(1) model
(the Bayes Factor is 0.74), and decisively better than the GLMM-AR(3) model (the
Bayes Factor is 2.14). It has much better goodness-of-fit than the multilevel models
without modeling serial correlation (the Bayes Factor of the GLMM-AR(2) versus
the GLMM-AR(0) is 15.33, and that of the GLMM-AR(2) versus the GLMM-CL1 is
18.48). The PROBIT model has very poor model quality, and the Bayes Factor of it
versus the best model is −50.45.
Figure 2.6 compares the random effects estimated by the GLMM-AR(2) and the
GLMM-AR(0) and shows that serial correlation correction make much difference in
estimating the random-effect coefficients. First, it is easy to see that heterogeneity
exits in both the time and spatial dimensions. The effect of trade openness varies from
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country to country, which can be substantively attributed to the different structure
of international trade in different countries. Trade openness is often suggested to
reduce state failure risk because it implies a deeper international engagement and a
bigger international influence on domestic politics (PITF Phase III Findings, 2000 );
however, if the major products exported from a given country are primary goods, this
trade structure may suggest a country to be more vulnerable to internal instability
since primary commodity exports indicate high dependency on natural resources and
may be associated with a weak government or more profitable rebellions for more
lootable resources (Doyle and Sambanix, 2000; Sambanis, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler,
2004). Working on the global model, King and Zeng (2001b) do not find that trade
openness is a statistically reliable variable. Based on the GLMM-AR(2) model of the
Sub-Saharan Africa, there are only three countries (Gabon, Gambia, and Malawi) in
which trade openness decreases state failure risk at a 90% credible level. For other
countries, an open market seems not to have clear effect on state failure. The countryspecific random intercept (in the third row in Figure 2.6) shows relative homogeneity,
which implies that there is not much unobserved heterogeneity after including the
country-level errors (graphs in the second row in Figure 2.6). However, the yearspecific intercept (in the bottom row) shows that heterogeneity exists across years.
Compared to the random effects estimated by the GLMM-AR(2) model, those based
on the GLMM-AR(0) have smaller error bands and consequently are overconfident
about the effect of trade openness (they suggest that trade openness has negative
effect on state failure risk in 10 instead of 3 countries with a 90% credible interval).
The differences of the posteriors based on the competing models are also reflected
by their within-sample forecast performance. Because one of the main goals in the
PITF study is to build a forecasting system based on statistical models, and also
because prediction is another means of assessing model quality, I further compare
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Figure 2.7: Comparison of Within-Sample Predicted Probs.
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the models with within-sample predicting. To avoid setting arbitrary or post hoc
thresholds for classifying failures or non-failures, I simply report the numeric predictive probabilities of state failure in all country-years, and compare the distribution
of predictive probabilities of the failure group and that of the non-failure group. As
shown in the upper graphs in Figure 3.3, the pooled probit model works poorly to
distinguish failures from non-failures, and the density kernels of the two groups have
a large overlapping area. The GLMM-CL1 model separates the two densities better
than the pooled model, but the two kernels are still not well separated. The GLMMAR(0) model further considers heterogeneity across time, and slightly reduces the
overlapping area compared to the GLMM-CL1 model. The GLMM-AR(2) model,
which considers the dynamics in the errors and makes use of the information ignored
in the former models, classifies the two groups much more accurately: the two density
kernels are well separated from each other, and only a very small part at the tails is
connected with each other. The second way to evaluate and compare the predicting
performance of the competing models used here is the Receiver-Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, as King and Zeng (2001b) do. The idea of using the ROC curve
to evaluate models’ predicting performance is simple: given a level of correct classification of one group (say, the failure group), the model performs better if it has
a higher rate of correct classification of the other group (say, the nonfailure group).
Graphically, the curve dominates other curves represents the best model among the
competing ones. This approach has the advantage of avoiding assigning any fixed
threshold for classification and assessing model performance based on a specific but
often arbitrary cutoff value. In Figure 3.3, the diagonal line is just used for reference,
indicating the extreme situation that the densities of the two groups are completely
overlapped. In the figure, the ROC curve based on the completely pooled probit
model is the lowest one. The GLMM-CL1 model improves forecasting by modeling
40

heterogeneity among countries, and its curve globally dominates that of the pooled
probit model. The GLMM-AR(0) model has an ROC curve globally but marginally
above the one of the GLMM-CL1, but it is dominated everywhere by the curve of
the GLMM-AR(2) model. The ROC curve of the GLMM-AR(2) model is almost a
horizontal line, indicating that since the densities of the predictive probabilities of the
failure and nonfailure groups are well separated, there is barely a trade-off between
the two types of classification.

2.6.2

Civil War Duration in the Sub-Saharan Africa

Political scientists have noticed the problem of nonstationarity in dynamic analysis and applied various unit-root and cointegration tests in time series analysis since a
long time ago (Beck, 1993; Durr, 1993; Smith, 1993; Williams, 1993; Box-Steffensmeier
and Tomlinson, 2000; DeBoef, 2001; Williams, 1993). However, the concern of nonstationary in linear time-series regressions has not been fully extended to TSCS analysis
in political science, though in econometrics, unit roots and cointegration testing on
panel data is an important on-going research field. Since TSCS data involves dynamic analysis, those problems causing trouble in time series analysis also apply to
the TSCS (panel) data. In this example, I use the empirical study on civil war duration to show that the GLMM-AR(p) model can serve as a stationarity test on the
TSCS model and helps detect spurious relationships between the response and explanatory variables resulting from nonstationarity and no cointegration. According to
the definition of cointegration, the residuals of a model should be stationary whenever
the regressors are cointegrated with the response variable (Hamilton, 1994, pp.57175); otherwise, statistical inferences are based on spurious regressions and, therefore,
unreliable. The GLMM-AR(p) model directly analyzes the residual (the error) pro-
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cess by assuming the process is stationary. If this assumption is violated, the model
should be re-specified to achieve cointegration or different models should be applied
(such as differencing or survival analysis). The MCMC simulation will give valuable
information about whether the error process is stationary; if the simulation process
shows difficulty (taking an abnormally long time) drawing or accepting legitimate
proposals (within the stationary space) for autoregressive coefficients, nonstationary
is suspected.
The civil war literature can be categorized into studies on war onset, war duration,
and war termination (Sambanis, 2002). Some quantitative research, applying survival
analysis, has found that civil war onset and duration are two different processes
and require different theories to explain them (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 2004;
Fearon, 2004). However, others, such as Edward Miguel and Sergenti (2004), suggest
that the theories applied to civil war onset are also relevant to civil war duration, and
their arguments are often based on more limited samples (such as the sub-Saharan
countries) and panel data analysis. In this subsection, I do not attempt to solve this
debate; instead, I use the GLMM-AR(p) model to show that TSCS analysis on civil
war duration without testing cointegration can produce unreliable results, which could
shed light on the debate and disagreement mentioned above. I use the same dataset
in Edward Miguel and Sergenti (2004); the response variable is civil war duration.
As Fearon and Laitin (2003b) point out, civil wars tend to be cumulative and last for
multiple periods. In the dataset, civil war (coded as 1) is often followed by civil wars
in multiple subsequent time periods, sometimes for more than 10 years, demonstrating
a very strong path-dependence. The underlying propensity for a country to stay in a
war may drift all over the place, but we cannot conduct unit root tests on the observed
dichotomous response variable to learn whether this underlying process is stationary
or not. On the other hand, many of the explanatory variables included in the model
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specified in Edward Miguel and Sergenti (2004) and other important models on war
duration are slow-moving, as shown in Table 2.3. These data features present the
necessity of testing whether the underlying dynamic process of the propensity for a
country staying in war is stationary, or whether those covariates are drifting together
with, and cointegrated with, the war propensity.
Edward Miguel and Sergenti (2004) use rainfall as an instrumental variable for
economic growth to avoid endogeneity, but this IV is weak and it is difficult to justify
that rainfall affects civil war duration only through its effect on economic growth (in
other words, it is uncorrelated with the error term) . Also, if economic growth data
cannot help achieve cointegration, it is unlikely that using the rainfall data is able to
do it. Therefore, I use the lagged economic growth rate directly. In their paper, they
also test whether economic growth has a varying effect on countries with different conditions for generating grievance and insurgency opportunities. I specify the GLMMAR(p) model with both country- and year-specific random intercepts and a random
coefficient for the variable of economic growth. The definitions and within-group variations are summarized in Table 2.3. I do not include two variables often used in civil
war onset models—noncontigeous states and new states—because they either have no
overall variation at all or very little variation in the sample country-years, which does
not allow us to learn anything about their effects. The variation of economic growth’s
effect is further explained by the same five explanatory variables—mountainous, oilexporting country, economic development level, male secondary school enrollment,
and democracy— as in Edward Miguel and Sergenti (2004). There are 743 observations (country-years) in total and 182 ongoing wars (24.50%). The data structure is
unbalanced—the minimum number of observations of a country is 9 (Namibia), and
the maximum number is 19. The average number of observations of a country is 18.1
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Symbol

war
gdpl
popl
mountainous
ethfrac
relfrac
oil
instab
anocracy
democracy
growth

Variable

Ongoing War
Income per capita (log)t−1
Population (log) t−1
Mountainous
Ethno-lingustic fractionalization
Religious fractionalization
Oil-exporting country
Political instability
Ancocracy t−1
Democracy t−1
GDP growth rate t−1

0.00
0.02
0.05
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02

0.17
0.11
0.15
0.00
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.35
0.29
3.48
0.05

0.51
0.33
0.21
0.00
0.51
0.51
0.00
0.51
0.51
7.21
0.20

0.36
0.55
1.17
1.43
0.23
0.30
0.18
0.22
0.22
3.99
0.04

0.43
0.60
1.21
1.45
0.24
0.33
0.19
0.38
0.39
5.05
0.07

Mean

0.47
0.66
1.23
1.50
0.25
0.36
0.20
0.51
0.51
5.96
0.13

Max

Min

Max

Min

Mean

Within-Year Variation

Within-Country Variation

Table 2.3: Within-Group Variation of Variables: Civil War Duration Study

with standard deviation as 2.56. The minimum number of observations of a year is
36 (1999), and the mean is 39.1 with standard deviation as 1.89.
In Figure 2.8, the graphs in the left column present the posteriors based on the
models without considering serial correlation in the errors. The GLMM-AR(0) model,
by controlling for heterogeneities in both serial and spatial dimensions, produces
different estimates than those produced by the simple probit model, have much larger
error bands, and find fewer variables important. Nonetheless, both models suggest
that most theories applied to civil war onset are relevant to civil war duration: in
terms of their importance and their effect directions, most covariates perform similarly
as in civil war onset models such as in Fearon and Laitin (2003b), Cederman and
Girardin (2007), and Fearon, Kasara and Laitin (2007). Then, I run the GLMMAR(p) models with p = 1, 2, 3, 4, and the autoregressive coefficients in all those
models approach unit roots soon after the simulations start. After varying numbers
of iterations (from the longest time of about 120,000 iterations for the GLMM-AR(1)
model to the shortest of about 70,000 iterations for the GLMM-AR(3) model), those
simulations are aborted because they all encounter difficulty drawing or accepting
proposals in the stationary spaces. In the right column of Figure 2.8, I summarize the
draws based on the GLMM-AR(1) and -AR(2) models before the MCMC simulations
are abnormally terminated. Note that the outputs cannot tell us anything about the
parameters since they are not justified to be sampled from the ergodic distributions.
I use them only to demonstrate how different the empirical results could be when
we take seriously the dynamics and cointegration problems. The last graph in the
right column reports the samples of the autoregressive coefficients in the four models
before the MCMC simulations halt. It is clear that they are very close to the unit
circle and have the tendency to go out of the stationary space.
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Figure 2.8: Random Intercepts and Random Effects
Before Correcting Serial Correlation
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The marginal likelihood of the five models—PROBIT: −399.514; GLMM-AR(0): −327.632. For
GLMM-AR(1) to -AR(4), because the MCMC process halted for not being able to obtain legitimate
proposals for autoregressive coefficients, no convergence diagnosis can be done and the marginal
likelihood is meaningless since the simulation is terminated abnormally.
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The evidence found in the MCMC simulation processes based on the GLMMAR(p) models suggests that the slow-moving explanatory variables are not cointegrated with civil war duration, and statistical inferences based on the pooled probit
or multilevel analysis without considering stationarity of the error process are spurious. The solution might be to add a lagged response variable as a regressor in addition
to the autoregressive errors since the lagged on-going war is likely to drift with the
current war, or we can try to find other time-varying explanatory variables which
can be cointegrated with the propensity of civil war duration. Solving the problem
could be a separate research project, and here I only illustrate the importance of
considering the dynamic process of the error term in TSCS analysis and show that
the GLMM-AR(p) model can be used for the purpose of cointegration testing and
avoiding spurious regressions in discrete TSCS analysis.

2.7

Discussion

In TSCS analysis, modeling inter-temporal dependence, contemporary correlation, and heterogeneity at the same time is required by the TSCS data structure
and their correlated design. But for categorical responses, this is difficult and complicated to do because of the complex errors structure caused by serially correlated
errors and nonlinearity of the model. Moreover, since TSCS analysis investigates
dynamic processes, unit roots and cointegration tests are necessary for avoiding spurious regressions; however, those tests are quite challenging for discrete TSCS data
and still an active research filed in panel data econometric analysis. This chapter
proposes a Bayesian GLML-AR(p) model as a solution, and developes an MCMC algorithm which improves the conventional simulation schemes by orthogonalizing the
error term and adding an auxiliary parameter u . This method facilitates construct47

ing the conditional distributions of the time-specific random-effect coefficients, and
achieves the goal of conducting data augmentation in one block. It also dramatically
simplifies and stabilizes estimating the Bayes Factor, which makes it much easier and
more reliable to use the Bayes Factor to determine the order of the error autoregressive process. I further improve simulation efficiency by using the PGM-MGMC
updating. A possible future extension of this model can be to relax the assumption
that time-specific common shocks have the same impact on different units, which may
turn out to be a multifactor residual-style model with a hierarchical setup and serial
correlated errors.
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Chapter 3
Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil
War Onset: How Much
Background Factors and Dynamics
Matter

One of the surprising empirical findings in the quantitative literature on civil war
is that ethnicity has an unclear effect on civil war, and the relationship between the
two is not statistically robust to different samples or model specifications (see a comprehesive review in Sambanis (2002)), despite strong and direct causalities suggested
by nationalist theories (Huntington, 1968; Russett, 1964; Scott, 1976; Muller, 1985;
Deutsch, 1953; Anderson, 1983; Horowitz, 1985; Ignatieff, 1993; Huntington, 1996;
Wimmer, 2002) and the often highlighted ethnic factors in civil war case studies
(Collier and Sambanis, 2005). Two recent APSR papers (Cederman and Girardin,
2007; Fearon, Kasara and Laitin, 2007) revisited this question and focused on the
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state (group) level. Instead of using the widely-employed measure of ethno-linguistic
fractionalization (ELF) and other proxies for nationalist grievance (such as ethnic
divisions (Ellingsen, 2000) and polarization (Reynal-Querrol, 2002)), they measured
ethnic minority rule (EMR) which is directly related to violence against the state.
Their perspective is valuable because the investigation on EMR’s effect shortens the
causal chain between ethnicity and civil war by clearly asking a more straightforward
question: how does ethnic political dominance affect civil war risk (Bates, 1999)? In
addition, EMR is an theoretically important and interesting predictor of civil war, and
answering the question about the effect of ethnic minority rule, by itself, contributes
to understanding civil war.
However, the variable of EMR has serious measurement problems. The measure constructed by Cederman and Girardin (2007, henceforth, CG), focusing on the
ethnicities of politicians in important governmental positions, faces aggregation difficulties; and Fearon et al (2007, henceforth, FKL) simply used government leader’s
ethnicity, which is subject to the problem that the leader’s ethnic group is not necessarily the dominant group in politics, such as African-Americans in the United
States under the Obama government. Hence, it is unrealistic to expect that EMR,
coded with either of the two different criteria, has the same meaning, or generates
the same degree of nationalist grievance, or provides the same rebellion opportunities in different countries with different political, economic, and social backgrounds.
This poses a challenge for large N studies, because, without considering those variations, the conclusions based on quantitative analyses can be overgeneralized and
misleading. As is explicitly suggested by FKL, in order to identify causalities instead
of only correlations, we should model the variation of EMR’s effect across countries
and analyze the background factors which are likely to alter the relationship between
EMR and civil war onset. In addition, to find a reliable causal relationship between
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EMR and civil war onset, other sources of confounding also need to be controlled for.
Because the civil war data are time-series cross-sectional and rich in structure, there
are multiple confounders, including serial correlation and unobserved heterogeneity in
both the time and spatial dimensions. Without analyzing those factors, endogeneity
and inefficiency of estimators will lead to unreliable statistical inferences and poor
forecasts.
This chapter focuses on explaining the heterogeneous effect of EMR on civil war
onset by handling the challenges resulting from observed and unobserved background
factors and the rich structure of the civil war data. The solution proposed in this
chaper is to use a generalized linear multilevel model which is able to explain the
variation of EMR’s effect by using a country-level regression. To control for serial
correlation (the dynamic process in the error term) and other unobserved heterogeneity in both the time and spatial dimensions, the model specifies a pth order
autoregressive error process and two unnested sources of clustering at the year and
country levels. I estimate the model with various lag orders and compare competing
models. The empirical results suggest strong positive autocorrelation lasting for multiple time periods and a salient variation of EMR’s effect on civil war onset across
countries. Political instability (regime stability) is the most important background
factor which amplifies EMR’s effect on civil war onset. Male secondary school enrollment, which proxies for governance quality and the strength of the government,
is likely to reduce the effect of EMR on civil war risk, but its intervening effect is
not with high certainty. No evidence is found to support the importance of ethnic
diversity for the relationship between EMR and civil war onset. The robustness of
those findings is checked with different variable selections and various measures of
EMR. The generalized linear multilevel model with an autoregressive error process
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(henceforth, GLMM-AR(p) model) improves the reliability of statistical inferences
and the performance of within-sample forecasts.

3.1

Grievance and Opportunities of Rebellion

Empirical studies on civil war often find that once economic and other material
factors are controlled for, the variables proxying for nationalist grievance are not important (Edward Miguel and Sergenti, 2004; Fearon, 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004;
Fearon and Laitin, 2003b; Collier and Hoeffler, 2002; Sarkees, 2000b). This finding has
been interpreted with an emphasis on the opportunities for mobilizing and financing
rebellion. Political and economic rationales triumph nationalist grievance, and the
more important elements in civil war are the expected gain and the opportunity cost
on the rebellion side, and the counter-insurgent capabilities on the state side. Particularly, Fearon and Laitin (2003b) argue that civil war risk should be better explained by
focusing on a central government’s financial, organizational, and political weaknesses
and the conditions favoring insurgencies (insurgent relative to counterinsurgent capabilities). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) also stress that understanding civil war should
analyze both the motive and opportunity mechanisms: bad economic situations not
only generate grievance (which could then become nationalist grievance), but also
weaken the central government’s counterinsurgent capacities, which consequently increases the expected gain from rebellion and decreases the opportunity cost; other
material factors, such as lootable resources, can be interpreted not only as favorable
conditions for financing rebellion but also mechanisms creating motives for rebellion
(“greed”), since looting the resources by itself can be one of the goals or motives of
rebellion. Associated with lootable resources, primary commodity exports as a large
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proportion of GDP has also been used as an indicator of a weaker government, and,
accordingly, better chance for the rebels to take over power.
Recently, CG casted doubt on those interpretations which are based on economic
and political rational choice theories. CG attributed the empirical null finding on
ethnicity’s effect to the measures of objective nationalist grievance, especially the
widely-used ELF index. They pointed out the gap between a measure of microlevel grievance and an event (civil war) at the macro level. They also proposed an
alternative measure, the N ∗ index, which is attempted to directly measure “control” of
the state by different ethnic groups. Since a civil war is a conflict for ownership of the
state and occurs at the group level1 , state control by ethnic groups does not have the
same difficulty as the ELF index has in explaining how intergroup conflicts escalate to
a war against the state. Their research is an effort to overcome the common problem
of using micro-level data to analyze a macro-level event in quantitative studies on
civil war (Sambanis, 2002). This gap makes empirical findings hard to interpret, and
theories are also difficult to test precisely, since the causal chain is long and complex
and can be altered by many intervening factors.
However, their study implies only one mechanism through which EMR affects
civil war onset: EMR generates nationalist grievance against the government and,
consequently, increases civil war risk. This hypothesis is based on the theory that
the nation-building is the driving force of civil war (CG, 2007). Their argument
ignores the long-existing economic and political rational choice theories, and does
not address the question of how fighting for control of the state can be separated
from the opportunity problems and the rational cost-benefit calculation. Another
difficulty is measuring the variable of ethnic state control (refer to FKL’s criticism of
1

The government has to be involved in all various definitions of civil war (Small and Singer, 1982;
Sarkees, 2000a; Fearon and Laitin, 2003b; Sambanis, 2004).
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this measure for details). CG claimed that their coding criterion was to consider the
ethnic identities of politicians in senior governmental positions, but there is a serious
aggregation problem and an associated heterogeneity concern: the importance of
different positions is different in the same country, and the significance of positions
with the same or similar name can vary much across different countries. In addition,
the N ∗ index is time-invariant, and only four countries are identified as “minority
ethnic group(s) in power (EGIP)” among 90 sample countries2 , which is hard to
believe since the sample time period spans 55 years. FKL showed that CG’s empirical
findings were highly sensitive to reasonable modifications of coding and relied mainly
on three of the four cases of minority EGIP. FKL further proposed an alternative
measure which focuses on government leader’s ethnicity. They also put the research
question more straightforwardly: “(a)re countries at greater risk of civil war when
the state is controlled by an ethnic minority?” This question is directly related to
the nationalist grievance question but does not imply that the effect of EMR on civil
war onset is solely through this mechanism. Nonetheless, nationalist grievance is
an important channel, which is highlighted by FKL with a quotation from Gellner
(Gellner, 1983, p.1):
there is one particular form of the violation of the nationalist principle
to which nationalist sentiment is quite particularly sensitive: if the rulers
of the political unit belong to a nation other that of the majority of the
ruled, this, for nationalists, constitutes a quite outstandingly intolerable
breach of political propriety.
Leader’s ethnicity, as a measure of EMR, is straightforward and easy to code. It
also has the advantage of being time-varying and being able to include much more
2

Because of missing data, the number of countries included in their models is 85.
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country-years in the analysis (161 countries in 55 years). KFL investigated the relationship between EMR and civil war onset, and their empirical results do not suggest
any statistically significant connection between the two. Checking the samples case
by case, FKL recognized that using the leader’s ethnicity to measure EMR had its
own problems. First, in some countries, the ethnic group that the government leader
comes from does not necessarily mean that the group is politically dominant. Examples are found in several sample county-years, such as a Scottish prime minister
in Britain (Douglas-Home, 1963), the Galician Franco in Spain, the Georgian Stalin
in the USSR, Slovak General Secretaries in Czechoslovakia, and rotating presidencies
in Switzerland and post-Tito communist Yugoslavia. Recognizing this confounding,
they recoded these cases and got similar empirical results. However, there is another
important problem which they mentioned in their paper but did not provide a solution. There are observable and unobservable factors that can affect the relationship
between leader’s ethnicity and civil war since the causal chain is long and indirect.
First, as already mentioned, the ethnicity of the leader does not necessarily measure
the primary explanatory variable—the dominance of the leader’s ethnic group for
some (democratic) institutional or (imperial) policy reasons. In this situation the
nationalist grievance mechanism is not relevant. Second, both Gellner (1993) and
Wimmer (2002) have suggested that minority political dominance may cause nationalist resentment and perception of greater opportunities to take over power. Even
though leader’s ethnicity measures ethnic dominance most of the time as well as FKL
claimed, the dichotomous variable does not measure the level of nationalist grievance
or rebellion opportunities in different countries. Following the greed-grievance framework of Collier and Hoeffler (2001) and Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (2004), motives
(mainly grievance) and opportunities are two dimensions for analyzing civil war, and
the two are entangled. Rebellion is not solely driven by grievance or anger, but also
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based on the rational cost-benefit analysis. There are various intervening factors that
can alter the mechanism by which EMR affects civil war risk, such as the following
factors which theoretically predict the variation of this relationship across countries.
Political Instability
In an unstable regime, a country may be more vulnerable to civil war under ethnic
minority rule than under ethnic plurality rule (EPR), at least for two reasons. First,
if in a country EMR does generate a higher level of nationalist grievance, political
instability can provide greater opportunities to successfully take over the ownership of
the state since the government is weak (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, 2004); therefore, increased nationalist grievance under EMR, as increased motives of rebeling, is
facilitated with better opportunities provided by political instability, which is consequently more likely to trigger civil war than in politically stable countries. Second,
frequent regime transformation by itself can generate more grievance (nationalist or
not) and hence higher risk of civil war (Hegre et al., 2001). In this situation, under
ethnic minority rule, the ethnic plurality group on the rebellion side can overcome the
collective action problem more easily than the minority group(s) because they have
a larger pool from which they can mobilize people and recruit soldiers. This is based
on the theory that ethnicity provides a tie affiliating the people of the same ethnic
group and helps overcome the collective action problem since once an ethnic group
is involved in a civil war, participation of the people in that group is hard to avoid
(Horowitz, 1985; Rothschild and Foley, 1988). In other words, the threshold of civil
war onset can be more easily surpassed by the plurality group (Granovetter, 1978;
Sambanis, 2002; Tilly, 2003). Likewise, in a regime which is stable either because the
level of grievance is low or because the government is strong and capable, the leader’s
ethnicity may not make much difference to civil war risk. Therefore, political stability
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can alter the effect of EMR on civil war propensities and change the difference made
by EMR and EPR.
Economy and Governance Capacities
When the economy is good, the opportunity cost of rebellion is high because the
expected gain in the labor market is bigger than when the economy is bad. Also,
the expected return of rebellion is lower because the government may have more
resources to crack down the rebellion and has a better chance to win the war. In a
strong economy, whether there is minority rule or majority rule may not make much
difference in that the cost-benefit calculation and a strong government predict that
rebellion is expected not to be so profitable as in economic bad times (Edward Miguel
and Sergenti, 2004). If the economy is bad and the government is weak, both grievance
and greed can increase, and then leader’s ethnicity may be a more sensitive issue
and be blamed for bad policies, and nationalist grievance is generated naturally or
artificially; at the same time, the same collective action mechanism stated above also
applies to this case. In addition, if EMR is as good as EPR at providing public
goods and governance of high quality, leader’s ethnicity does not necessarily generate
greater nationalist grievance, and civil war risk would not be significantly higher under
EMR than uner EPR (Grossman, 1995; Hirschleifer, 1995; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).
Together with the factor of political stability, this suggests that if a government is
strong, capable, and willing to provide public goods under a relatively stable regime,
leader’s ethnicity should make less difference to civil war onset risk.
Ethnicity Diversity
Ethnically more diverse societies may mean a more serious collective action problem (Sambanis, 2002; Collier and Hoeffler, 2000). However, the question on the
relationship between EMR and civil war implies that the wars under investigation
should occur between the ethnic minority in power and the ethnic plurality group on
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the rebellion side. If this is true, it can be assumed that the plurality ethnic group is
able to recruit soldiers at least from its own ethnic group (Horowitz, 1985; Rothschild
and Foley, 1988), and has the advantage of overcoming the collective action problem.
According to the measure of ELF, in a less diverse country where the majority has
much larger population than the minority group, the politically excluded majority
can more easily cross the threshold of civil war on the one hand. On the other, the
plurality group will feel more pain at being excluded from the top leadership and
hold stronger nationalist grievance. This logic predicts that in less diverse countries
or countries with a more polarized ethnicity distribution, EMR may be more likely to
cause civil war than in more diverse countries. However, based on the existing literature, ethnic diversity is often suggested to be associated with higher likelihood of civil
war because nationalist grievance is more common and inter-ethnic group conflict is
more likely. Although the mechanism by which those social conflicts among ethnic
groups escalate to a war against the government is unclear, a government headed by
an ethnic minority member may be more vulnerable to civil conflicts in an ethnically
more diverse country: the population is more equally distributed among several ethnic groups and more groups could be potential challengers to the dominant minority
group. Given the high level of nationalist grievance among groups in a more diverse
country, EMR provides more opportunities for inter-group grievance to escalate to a
war against the government. The collective action approach predicts that lower ethnic diversity increases EMR’s effect on civil war onset, while the national grievance
approach suggests that higher ethnic diversity leads to a stronger effect of EMR.
Democracy
Democracy can be another important factor intervening in the relationship between EMR and civil war. Theoretically, a democratically elected leader has his or
her legitimacy recognized by the opponents, because one important characteristic of
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democracy is that the losers in an election admit the legitimacy of the government
headed by the winner and will try to take over the office within the democratic institutional framework (in the next election) rather than resorting to rebellion (Dahl,
1989; Gasiorowski, 1995; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2003). Following this logic, it can
be expected that, in democracies, EMR does not necessarily incur more civil war
than EPR because the leader is elected and has legitimacy, but in non-democracies,
the legitimacy of the leader is more questionable and more easily challenged by other
groups. Furthermore, there is no “next election” in non-democracies for the ethnic
plurality group to lawfully take over power, and they are left with rebellion as the
most straightforward, if not the only, avenue to change the ownership of the state.
However, this logic is based on the theoretical or ideal type of democracies; in reality,
especially in new, immature or unstable democracies, the legitimacy of elected leaders
is sometimes not recognized by the challengers who question the fairness and legitimacy of the election. Leader’s ethnicity can be easily used as a justification for the
plurality group to refuse to recognize the government. At the same time, in immature
democracies, repression is reduced and collective action is easier than in authoritarian
regimes (Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998; Hegre et al., 2001), since the plurality group
can use their lawful rights such as gathering, free speech, and protests, for mobilization at early stages of rebellion. Therefore, EMR in those immature democracies may
be more vulnerable to civil war than EPR.
Shocks, Historical Memory and other factors
International and historical factors can also alter the degree that EMR affects
civil war risk. For example, external shocks could temporally make the country array
under the flag, and domestic nationalist grievance is dwarfed by grievance against
external entities or by external threats to the survival of the country as a whole.
Another example may be historical memory: if a country has experienced conflicts
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(not necessarily civil war) between the minority group the leader belongs to and the
plurality group, or, in other words, if there is unsolved historical hostility between
the two groups, it is more likely that EMR will increase civil war risk.

3.2

Methodological Problems

FKL also expressed their concern about the “background” factors which could
alter the relationship between EMR and civil war onset. However, the fixed-effect
panel model they used is apparently not a solution since the model only controls
for unobserved heterogeneity but is not able to capture the coefficient variation of
EMR across countries. Another possibility suggested by FKL is to find instrumental
variables which are not correlated with the background factors but associated with
EMR and civil war. However, it is extremely difficult coming up with such IVs and
providing a convincing justification that the those IVs are not uncorrelated with the
error term because the background factors are not all known. Not being able to find a
satisfactory solution, FKL cautiously interpreted their estimates only as “correlation”
instead of “causality”.
In fact, to analyze the variation of EMR’s impact on civil war across countries,
there is a simple solution—a multilevel model with group-level regressions, with which
the variation of EMR’s effect across countries can be modeled in a group-level regression with its own regressors and error term. Multilevel analysis has been widely used
in time-series cross-section data analysis and more generally longitudinal analysis in
many disciplines. It has been well developed in both the conventional and Bayesian
frameworks (Hagenaars, 1990; Singer and Willett, 2003; Yang, Fu and Land, 2004;
Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004; Molenberghs and Verbeke, 2005). One particularly important characteristic of multilevel modeling for the current study is that the
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predictors can enter the model at the correct level, and variations within and between
groups can be modeled for both theoretical and methodological reasons (Gill, 2007,
p.395). In addition, several slow-moving or time-invariant predictors are important
in civil war study, but collinearity is a big concern for the fixed-effect panel model
(Shor et al., 2007). In contrast, multilevel modeling avoids this pitfall by placing
those variables into the group-level regression (Gelman and Hill, 2006; Gelman, 2006,
pp.246-247).
Besides applying a multi-level model to explain the country-level variation of
EMR’s effect, it is also important to control for other sources of confounding in order
to better identify causal relationship rather than only “correlation”. The structural
characteristics of the civil war data as TSCS data cause correlation from multiple
sources. The civil war database used in the present chapter is constructed by Fearon
and Laitin (2003b); Fearon, Kasara and Laitin (2007). Originally, there are 161 countries in 55 years (from 1945 to 1999) with 6610 observations (country-years). The
data structure is not balanced, and some countries start to be observed quite late.
Different model specifications contain slightly different sample sizes due to missing
data in some variables. Based on the final model specification applied in this chapter
which is described in the next section, there are 6210 observations consisting of 155
countries across 55 time periods (years) from 1945 to 1999, among which 104 war
onsets are observed3 . In the unit dimension (countries), the minimum number of
3

Civil war is a rare event here, but the panel is big and the number of events is not too small. The
case-control study is attempted to reduce the expense of collecting enough data for analyzing rare
events, and has been used in many empirical studies. King and Zeng (2001a) and King and Zeng
(2001c) introduced it to political science and demonstrated its efficiency and consistency. However,
in the present case, the data are given, and a big dataset has already been built for the analysis.
From both the conventional and Bayesian point of view, using all information in data is always
preferred than resampling from the given dataset and using part of the observations. Resampling
will also break the data structure and artificially reduce the TSCS data into cross-sectional data,
which results in further information loss. For these reasons, I use TSCS analysis instead of resampling
the data and applying the case-control approach.
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observations of a country is only 3 and the maximum is 55, and the average number
of observations of a unit is 40.1 with a sample standard deviation as large as 15.05.
In the spatial dimension, the minimum number of observations in a year is 34, and
the maximum is 146. The sample mean of the number of observations in a year is
113 and the standard deviation is 28.15.
Besides the variation of EMR’s effect, there is likely to be other unobserved heterogeneity of the sample countries. If this heterpgeneity is correlated with any of the
regressors, the estimator is biased. Also, theories of international relations emphasize
the importance of the international system. Disturbances in the international system
form common observed or unobserved shocks on countries which may affect civil war
risk. Again, endogeneity arises when those omitted common shocks are not strictly
exogenous. Furthermore, serial correlation is not only a source of inefficiency but also
can be a further cause of endogeneity, because several important covariates are conventionally lagged to avoid endogeneity (such as per capita income, population and
democracy). In TSCS analysis, lagged values should be used with caution and along
with serial correlation correction, because, if the residual in the previous period is correlated with the residual in the current period, i.e., Cov(ξt , ξt−1 ) 6= 0, and if the some
of the covariates are lagged because they are probably correlated with the residual,
namely, Cov(xt−1 , ξt−1 ) 6= 0, we have Cov(xt−1 , ξt ) 6= 0, resulting in endogeneity.
There are multiple ways of controlling for serial correlation sugguested in the
political methodological literature (Beck and Katz, 2009, 2004; Beck et al., 2002;
Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998; Beck and Katz, 1995). Fearon and Laitin (2003b) report
the trouble they encounter when trying to correct serial correlation. They found
that conventional methods, such as the lagged dependent variable as a regressor and
time splines, did not find serial dependence. Still suspicious of serial independence
based on theories and other prior information, they decided to use the variable of
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lagged ongoing war to control for serial correlation. This variable turned out to
have considerable explanatory power, and has been adopted by the following studies
(Cederman and Girardin, 2007; Fearon, Kasara and Laitin, 2007). Although the
lagged ongoing war may partially control for serial correlation as a lagged independent
variable approach, there is no direct assurance that serial correlation in the errors is
adequately corrected. Also, the sign of the lagged ongoing war in their model is
negative, which can be reasonably interpreted as follows: since wars take resources
and serve as an outlet of grievance, a ongoing war in the previous time period decreases
the propensity of civil war onset in the current period. However, it is not easy to
interpret the negative sign as negative serial correlation. In the probit model, serial
correlation exists in the latent dynamic process which can be regarded as the dynamic
change of the propensity for war onset. Hence, it is difficult to have a theoretical
explanation of negative serial correlation of war propensity or risk. In addition,
with several explanatory variables lagged (the ongoing war, autocracy, democracy,
population, and income), it is important to ensure that the errors approximate a
white noise process (uncorrelated), which can only be done by directly modeling the
errors. For the purpose of directly and thoroughly correcting serial correlation, I
specify a autoregressive process of the error term whose lag order is determined by
model comparison based on the Bayes Factor. This method allows the errors to
approximate a white noise process and ensures serial independence after correction.

3.3

Model Specification and Data Description

I apply a Bayesian generalized linear multilevel model with pth-order autoregressive errors (GLMM-AR(p)) presented in Chapter refch2 to identify the causal relationship between EMR and civil war onset and to explain the variation of EMR’s
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effect across countries. Based on previous theoretical and methodological discussions
and after comparing various preliminary models, I apply the following core model
specification to analyze the civil war data and investigate the varying relationship
between EMR and civil war risk across countries:

Onseti,ti = 1(Latenti,ti > 0),

(3.1)

Latenti,ti = βti + b1i + β2,i ∗ EMR + β11 ongwar + β12 ∗ gdpenl + β13 ∗ lpopl
+ β14 ∗ lmtnest + β15 ∗ ncotig + β16 ∗ oil + β17 ∗ newstate
+ β18 ∗ instab + β18 ∗ polity2 + β19 ∗ ancol + β210 ∗ ethfrac + ξi,ti ,
(3.2)
β2,i = β21 + β22 ∗ minstab + β23 ∗ methfrac + β24 ∗ second + b2i ,

(3.3)

βti = β0 + cti ,

(3.4)

ξi,ti = ρ1 ξi,ti −1 + ... + ρp ξi,ti −p + ui,ti ,

(3.5)

The meanings of the covariate symbols and the within-country and within-year variations of the included variables are summarized in Table 4.2, and the coding criteria of
the variables are reported in Fearon and Laitin (2003b,a) and FKL. The individuallevel regression, equation (3.2), follows the core specification in Fearon and Laitin
(2003), CG, and FKL. Unlike FKL, I include Democracy (polity2) in the model
because CG found that democracy merited inclusion, while FKL did not test it. I use
country-specific and year-specific intercepts to control for unobserved heterogeneity in
the time and spatial dimensions. Note that this specification cannot be allowed in the
fixed-effect panel model because of the slow-moving and time-invariant variables, such
as Mountainous (lmtnest) and Ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ethfrac). The
variable, Secondary school enrollment, has no variation across time for almost all
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countries, and its variation among countries does not change over time, either. This
suggests that using its country averages in the group-level regression does not discard
information in the data.
In the country-level regression, equation (3.3), the variation of EMR’s effect, β2,i ,
is explained by both observed (the country-level regressors) and unobserved background factors (the error term, b2i ). I do not include Democracy as a country-level
covariate for two reasons: first, it is a time-varying variable and the average of this
variable poorly describes the background; second, preliminary model specifications
with democracy averaged within countries have worse model quality than the present
one (according to the marginal likelihood), and the posterior distribution of its effect is estimated to be centered at zero and with a small error band. This does not
necessarily mean that democracy is not an important factor, and could be attributed
to the fact that the average does not capture the background. Therefore, I leave
the general regime or institutional factors as unobserved in the error term. Political
instability is coded by Fearon and Laitin (2003b) as “a dummy variable indicating
whether the country had a three-or-greater change on the Polity IV regime index in
any of the three years prior to the country-year in question”, which is labeled by
them as “political stability” but actually measures regime stability. The within-unit
average of this variable is used in the group level regression. Since whether a regime
is stable or not should not be judged by presence or absence of transformation, instead, the frequency of regime change during a certain period time reflects political
instability. Therefore, the average is a good measure of instability of a country during the sample years. To measure the background factor of government strength and
governance quality, I do not use the average per capita income, even though it is often
regarded as a good proxy for the two factors. The major reason is that the withincountry variation of per capita income is not small. As is in the case of democracy,
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onset
ongwar
gdpenl
lpopl
lmtnest
ncontig
oil
nwstate
instab
anocl
ethfrac
minldr1
polity2l
second

War outbreak
Ongoing wart−1
Income per capitat−1
Log(popuplation)t−1
Log(% Mountainous)
Noncontiguous state
Oil producer
New state
Political Instability
Anocracyt−1
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization
Ethnicity Minority Leader
Democracyt−1
Secondary school Enrollment

0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.07
0.15
1.26
0.25
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.17
0.26
0.26
0.00
0.11
2.88
0.00

0.35
0.51
17.50
0.71
0.00
0.50
0.50
0.49
0.53
0.53
0.13
0.51
9.23
0.04

0.00
0.00
1.81
1.36
1.27
0.36
0.26
0.00
0.00
0.31
0.26
0.44
6.73
0.11

0.11
0.32
4.03
1.45
1.39
0.38
0.33
0.13
0.35
0.42
0.28
0.47
7.39
0.11

Mean

0.24
0.42
6.55
1.53
1.45
0.43
0.39
0.40
0.45
0.50
0.30
0.49
7.74
0.11

Max

Min

Max

Min

Mean

Within-Year Variation

Within-Country Variation

The variations reported in the table is the descriptive summary of the variance of the variables within a country and
within a year.

Symbol

Variable

Table 3.1: Within-Group Variation of Variables

its average is not a good measure of country-specific economic background. Instead, I
use Male secondary school enrollment which captures the governance quality and the
capability of the government to prevent civil war from occurring. Per capita income
and male secondary school enrollment are highly correlation (ρ ≈ 0.8), and since the
latter is almost time-invariant and the former is a time-varying variable, it is better
to use secondary school enrollment in the group-level regression as a proxy for economic development. Furthermore, secondary school enrollment directly reflects the
capability and willingness of the government to provide public goods to the society
and measures, more generally, governance quality. The variable of Ethno-linguistic
fractionalization is a direct measure of the ethnic background of a country, and it is
almost time-invariant; the country average of this variable is ready to be used in the
group-level regression. Unobserved background factors are included in the group-level
error term.

3.4

Empirical Results and Interpretations

I assign diffuse conditional conjugate priors on all parameters except the autoregressive coefficients ρ , and use the Gibbs sampler to update those parameters. Since
there is no conditional conjugate prior on ρ , they are simulated with the MetropolisHasting algorithm (see Appendix 2.3). I specify uniform priors to the autoregressive
coefficients within the stationary space. Since the sample size is large, the prior specifications will not have a big influence on the posteriors, which is confirmed by sensitivity checks. The GLMM-AR(p) model only handles stationary dynamic processes
of the errors, and if the error process is not stationary, the causal relationships found
in regressions are spurious (Engle and Granger, 1987; Beck, 1993; Durr, 1993; Smith,
1993; Williams, 1993; Keele and De Boef, 2004). The errors follows a stationary dy67

namic process either when the process of civil war is stationary, or when the regressors
included are co-integrated with the response (Engle and Granger, 1987; Kao, 1999;
Pedroni, 1999, 2004). In fact, to study time-series-cross-section data, cointegration
testing is necessary to ensure estimates obtained to be reliable. However, there is no
good way to conduct cointegration tests for sophisticated nonlinear time-series crosssection models yet. The MCMC simulation designed for the GLMM-AR(p) model
will fail to generate legitimate proposals for updating the autoregressive coefficients
if the error process is not stationary. I write the R code in such a way that if the proposals keep being illegitimate for a pre-specified length of time, the simulation will be
halted and ab error message will be returned to suggest further check on stationarity.
Therefore, this model can serve as an informal cointegration test, and the following
estimates are ensured not to be spurious based on nonstationary panels.
I estimate the GLMM-AR(p) model with increasing lag orders starting with p = 0.
I compute the marginal likelihood of each model, and stop increasing the lag order
when decreasing marginal likelihood is observed. I also compare the more sophisticated GLMM-AR(p) model with two commonly-used alternative specifications, i.e.,
the completely pooled probit model (denoted as “PROBIT” in Figure 3.1) and the
probit multi-level model without year-specific random effects or serial correlation (denoted as “GLMM-CL1” in Figure 3.14 ). The simple probit model does not model the
variation of EMR’s effect, and serves as a replication of FKL’s model. The GLMMCL1 model can be regarded as a special case of the GLMM-AR(p) model with two
additional assumptions: the time-specific random effects have no variation, and the
errors are uncorrelated. I also tried to estimate the GLMM-CL1 model with serially correlated errors, but the error process was likely to be nonstationary—with an
4

It is equivalent to a fixed effect panel model regarding the country-level regression as interaction
terms and merging the group-level error term b2i with the random intercept (b1i ).
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AR(1) and AR(2) process, the first ten thousand draws (without the burnin stage)
of the autoregressive coefficients were very close to the unit circle, and then the
MCMC simulation halted because no legitimate proposals could be drawn within the
stationary space. Therefore, only the AR(0) GLMM-CL1 model could be successfully estimated by ignoring the dynamics. The suspected nonstationary error process
makes inferences based on the GLMM-CL1 model unreliable, but for model comparison purposes, I still summarize the MCMC output of the static GLMM-CL1 model
in Figure 3.1. However, adding the year-specific effects makes the same specification stationary. This is not surprising, because if time-specific effects are correlated
with each other, putting them into the error term will exaggerate serial correlation
and create spurious dynamics (Heckman, 1981), or because if time-specific effects are
correlated with other regressors, omitted time-dimension heterogeneity changes the
relationship between the dynamic process of civil war and the dynamic processes the
explanatory variables represent, which affects cointegration.
I compute Bayes Factors for all those models, and they indicate that the model
with a second order error autoregressive process is the best one (see Figure 3.1 for the
marginal likelihood of each model). I also do an insurance run of the GLMM-AR(4),
and find that its quality decreases compared to the AR(2) and AR(3) model. The
number of iterations for each model is 500,000 with a burnin stage of 50,000 iterations.
The chains of random-effect and low-level parameters mix much more slowly, which
slows down the whole process of convergence, since partial convergence should not be
regarded as convergence (Gill, 2008). Because there are more than 12,800 chains in
the MCMC simulation in each model, it is unrealistic to conduct formal convergence
diagnostics on all of them. Instead, I perform multiple convergence diagnostics by
using the coda package in R on all the fixed and random effects parameter posteriors,
but for the augmented data and the auxiliary parameter u , I randomly select a sample
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of size 100 from each chain and conduct convergence diagnoses. No evidence of nonconvergence is found in those diagnostics. In Figure 3.1, I present all six models with
95% credible intervals and the posteriors of the fixed parameters (at all levels). The
random effects (the random intercepts of b1i and βti , and the random effects of the
ethnic minority leadership (β2,i ) are plotted in Figure 3.2 based on the GLMM-AR(2)
model which has the best goodness-of-fit.
The posteriors based on the probit model are very similar to the results in FKL,
though the scales are different because of the different link functions (FKL used the
logistic link). With a big sample size, the point estimates of the Bayesian model
(posterior mean) are very similar to the maximum likelihood estimates if the same
link function were used. Unlike in FKL, I include two additional variables (democracy and ethno-linguistic fractionalization) in the model. Without modeling serial
correlation and heterogeneity among countries, the estimator tends to bias toward
0 and has much smaller error bands compared to posteriors based on the other five
models. For some of the variables, it yields very different substantive results. Larger
population increases civil war onset propensity with high certainty, but after controlling for heterogeneity, the direction of its effect reverses; modeling serial correlation
further, its effect becomes unclear. Similar change has been observed in the existing studies: the effect of population in the fixed-effect panel model is often different
from that in completely pooled models (Fearon and Laitin, 2003b; Collier, Hoeffler
and Soderbom, 2004; Fearon, Kasara and Laitin, 2007). It suggests that population
could be correlated with some omitted country-specific characteristics which also affect civil war. Those characteristics might include the territory, economic structure,
climate or other geographical features, and so on. It is often argued that more populous country incurs higher civil war risk because large population size enlarges the
pool of potential recruits (Fearon and Laitin, 2003b), but once confounding factors
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are controlled for, population does not have a certain effect. The probit model also
finds that non-contiguous countries are likely to have higher risk of civil war, but
the effect is uncertain, while models controlling for heterogeneity in either time or
spatial dimension suggest that it has a positive effect with a high level of certainty.
The completely pooled model also exaggerates the effect of new state status. For the
primary explanatory variable, EMR, the results confirm FKL and suggest that EMR
may increase the likelihood of civil war onset, but this effect only has a low level of
certainty.
After controlling for heterogeneity, the other five models all find that EMR, on
average, is more likely to decrease civil war risk, but this statement can only be made
with a low level of certainty (only 60%). Among the five multilevel models, the only
difference between GLMM-CL1 and GLMM-AR(0) is that the latter considers the
heterogeneity across years. The estimated time-dimension hetergeneity is mild. The
lower-right graph in Figure 3.2 shows the year-level variation (the year-specific intercept) based on the GLMM-AR(2) model. We can see that there is year-to-year
difference but the variation is not large. The Bayes Factor (log10 ) of the GLMM-AR(0)
versus GLMM-CL1 is 2.66, and decisively supports adding the year-level regression
(Greenberg, 2008). The improvement on model fit by modeling the year-level heterogeneity is also reflected by the forecasting performance, which is discussed in detail
in the next section. Between the two models, the posteriors of the fixed effect parameters are very similar. Nonetheless, for several variables, the GLMM-CL1 model
generates posteriors with the tendency of being biased toward 0. The GLMM-AR(p)
models with p > 0 find positive serial correlation which is not weak (the posterior
mean of ρ1 is 0.5 based on the AR(1) model) and probably lasts for more than one
time period (posterior means of ρ1 and ρ2 are both about 0.3 based on the AR(2)
model). Serial correlation correction and dynamic modeling greatly improve model
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quality, and the marginal likelihood (natural logarithm) increases by more than 20
(see Figure 3.2). Compared to the probit and GLMM-CL1 models, modeling serial
correlation yields three key differences: first, the error bounds are systematically bigger than those of the GLMM model without modeling serial correlation, confirming
the statistical theory that ignoring positive serial correlation results in narrower error
bands (Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognon, 1984; Poirier and Ruud, 1988). Second,
the effect of ongoing war in the previous time period is almost twice as big as in the
models without considering serial correlation. Apparently, serial correlation causes
biased estimation of this variable’s effect: ongoing war at time t − 1 is very likely to
be correlated with t−1 because the omitted factors which affect civil war onset are
likely to be correlated with ongoing civil war, too. If t−1 is correlated with t , there
is endogeneity arising from the correlation between ongoing civil war and the error
term. Without modeling serial correlation, the dynamics captured by the variable of
ongoing civil war are misleading. Further evidence is that, based on the estimated
autoregressive coefficients, the propensity for civil war is positively correlated, which
is a different mechanism than that suggested by using the variable of previous ongoing war since their signs are opposite. Third, within-sample prediction is improved
dramatically by making good use of the information contained in the dynamic error
process, which is analyzed in more detail in the next section.
All of the multilevel models detect salient heterogeneity of EMR’s effect on civil
war onset across countries. Figure 3.2 shows the heterogeneity estimated by the
GLMM-AR(2)5 , which indicates considerable heterogeneity across countries. The effect of EMR is more likely to be negative for about two thirds of the sample countries.
5

The cross-country heterogeneity estimated by all the multilevel models are very similar to each
other, and therefore only the random-effect posteriors based on the GLMM-AR(2) model are presented in the chapter.
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Figure 3.1: Posterior Summary with 95% Credibility Interval (Six Models)

The GLMM-AR(2) model finds that for three countries, i.e., Azerbaijan, Pakistan,
and Thailand, ethnic minority rule increases the likelihood of civil war onset with
a 95% credible level. However, the effect of EMR is at a low level of credibility for
most sample countries, and its directions vary widely across countries. In Figure 3.1,
the three posteriors of the group-level regressors partially explain this variation. The
effect of political instability is highly robust to various model specifications, and suggests that in a country which experiences frequent regime change, ethnic minority
rule is more vulnerable and creates higher risk of civil war than in politically stable
countries. Compared with the posteriors of the fixed-effect parameters, the error band
of political instability is much larger, which can be explained by the much smaller
sample size than at the individual level. The variable of male secondary school enrollment is likely to decrease the danger of civil war increased by EMR, but it is not
very certain (at a 70% credibility level). Ethno-linguistic fractionalization seems not
to have an effect on this relationship, which is expected based on the two opposite
mechanisms discussed in Section 3.1. The heterogeneity of EMR’s effect across countries can be compared with the relatively homogeneous country-level errors presented
in the upper-right graph in Figure 3.1. This comparison suggests that the group-level
regressors explains a large proportion of the variation of EMR’s effect on civil war
onset. The lower-left graph displays the country-specific intercept, which shows that,
aside from the hetergoneous effect of EMR on civil war, countries still demonstrate
differences in other respects and those differences are relevant to civil war onset.

3.5

Prediction

Assessing the goodness-of-fit of a statistical model is necessary to confidently draw
causal inferences based on the estimates (Hoeting et al., 1999). The Bayes Factor
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is a comprehensive criterion for this purpose, but within-sample and out-of-sample
predictions are not only important alternative ways to assess model quality but also
valuable in themselves. Especially for the civil war study, which has important policy
implications, better predictions based on a statistical model can serve as a warning
system and provide valuable information to policy makers. The GLMM-AR(p) model,
better identifying the causal relationships and making better use of the information
in the data (the dynamic process of the errors), performs better in forecasting6 .
In this section, I compare the forecast performance of the following four models:
the probit model, the GLMM-CL1, the GLMM-AR(p) model without serial correlation consideration, and the GLMM-AR(p) with an appropriate lag order (the second
order) of the autoregressive errors. The models under comparison use all the observa6

The relationship between better study of causal relationships and better and more stable forecasting is articulated in King and Zeng (2001).
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tions, and I only do within-sample predictions. The general within-sample predicting
performance of the four models is presented in Figure 3.3. To avoid setting arbitrary
or post hoc thresholds for classification of civil war or non-civil war, I first only report
the numeric predictive probabilities of civil war in all country-years and compare the
distributions of predictive probabilities of the civil war group and the non-civil war
group. If the densities of the two groups are well separated (the density of the civil
war group is plotted on the right side and that of the non-civil war group on the
left side in each figure), forecasts based on those predictive probabilities will make
few mistakes in both classifications (y = 0 and y = 1), which suggests that the
model performs well in forecasting. As shown in Figure 3.3 on the first row, the
pooled probit model does a bad job in differentiating the civil war cases from the
non-civil war ones, and the density kernels of the two groups are overlapping most
of the time. The GLMM-CL1 model, by modeling the variation of EMR’s effect and
other country-level heterogeneity, separates the two groups better than the pooled
model, but there is still a large overlapping area. The GLMM-AR(0) model further
considers heterogeneity in the time periods, and reduces the overlapping compared
to the GLMM-CL1 model. It is not a good model, either, though it is better than
the GLMM-CL1 model. The GLMM-AR(2) model, which models the dynamics and
makes good use of the information contained in the error term, well classifies the two
groups: the two density kernels are almost completely separated from each other, and
only a very small part at each tail is connected with the other.
The second way of evaluating and comparing the predicting performance of the
competing models is to use the Receiver-Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, as
King and Zeng (2001b) did. The idea of using the ROC curve to evaluate predicting
performance of models is simple: given a level of correct classification of one group
(say, y = 1), the model performs better if the rate of correct classification of the other
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of Within-Sample Predicted Probs.
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group (say, y = 0) is higher based on this model. Graphically, the curve dominating
other curves represents the best model among the competing ones. This approach has
the advantage of avoiding assigning any fixed threshold for classification and assessing
model performance based on any specific cutoff value. In Figure 3.3, the diagonal line
is the reference line, indicating the extreme situation that the predictive probabilities
of the two groups are completely mixed. The ROC curve based on the completely
pooled probit model is the lowest one. The GLMM-CL1 model improves forecasting
by modeling heterogeneity among countries, and its curve globally dominates the one
of the pooled probit model. The GLMM-AR(0) model has an ROC curve globally
above the one of the GLMM-CL1, but is dominated everywhere by the curve of
the GLMM-AR(2) model. The ROC curve of the GLMM-AR(2) model is almost a
horizontal line, indicating that, since the densities of the predictive probabilities of
the 1 and 0 groups are well separated, there is barely any trade-off between the two
types of classification7 .
Table 3.2 shows the top 15 best and worst predictions based on the GLMM-AR(2)
model and compares them with those based on the GLMM-AR(0) and GLMM-CL1
models. Because the probit model is the worst one, it is omitted here due to space
limitation. For the war cases, even the worst predictions of the GLMM-AR(2) are all
much better than the other two models, and most of the worst predictions of non-civil
war cases are also better. Figure 3.4 presents predictions of 8 selected countries in the
sample years. The selected countries experience most to fewest civil war onset events
7

Note that the horizontal ROC curve does not suggest that the GLMM-AR(2) model will correctly
classify all the country-years. This is because the threshold of classification should be set ex ante
based on the risk assessment and pre-specified loss function, rather than being chosen after the
pattern of predictive probabilities are observed. For instance, if setting a post hoc threshold of 0.32,
then the GLMM-AR(2) model makes no misclassification of either civil war or non-civil war; but we
may set an ex ante threshold of 0.60 if we think misclassification of civil war is much less expensive
than mistakenly identifying non-civil war as civil war, then most of the observed civil wars will be
misclassified as non-civil wars even based on the GLMM-AR(2) model.

78

(from 6 episodes to 0). All those figures and tables demonstrate that the GLMMAR(2) performs much better in statistical forecasting because it takes into account
two-dimensional heterogeneity and the dynamic process of the error term. Figure 3.5
shows the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation of the predicted probabilities
for a randomly selected country. For the three models with a static error process, the
predicted probabilities demonstrate an AR(2) or AR(1) process, which suggests that
their poor forecast performance should be largely attributed to ignoring the dynamics.

3.6

Robustness Checking

To check the robustness of the empirical findings, I have used different model
specifications: including some other variables, such as Democracy, in the countrygroup regression and the Cold war dummy in the year-level regression; excluding
ethno-linguistic fractionalizationin from the individual level regression; assigning different priors, and so on (the details are not reported in the present chapter). None of
them cause important changes, and the cold war dummy does not have explanatory
power. A more important way of checking robustness of the empirical findings is to
use alternative measures of EMR, as FKL did. They presented other two alternative
measures of EMR: for the first alternative, the previous measure of EMR is modified
by examining the data case by case and recoding those country-years as plurality
group dominance when leader’s ethnicity does not mean the dominance of their minority ethnic groups; the second alternative measure is to further recode white in
the same ethnic group as mestizo in Latin America based on the first alternative
measure. This changes the proportion of EMR in the sample substantially: the percentage of minority leader country-years decreases from 32.20% to 25.12%. I estimate
79
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1975
1950
1948
1946
1960
1996
1992
1962
1958
1981
1971
1992
1965
1991
1948

Angola
Indonesia
Burma
Phlippines
Congo(DR)
Congo(DR)
Azerbaijan
Rwanda
Indonesia
Nicaragua
Pakistan
Tajikistan
Indonesia
Haiti
Colombia

0.686
0.674
0.627
0.624
0.623
0.623
0.612
0.611
0.601
0.600
0.591
0.582
0.580
0.577
0.570

AR2
0.394
0.475
0.248
0.303
0.310
0.219
0.359
0.265
0.329
0.200
0.202
0.283
0.297
0.259
0.238

AR0
0.338
0.431
0.199
0.297
0.301
0.190
0.246
0.257
0.265
0.135
0.199
0.197
0.241
0.182
0.157

CL1
The U.K.
Sri Lanka
Argentina
Iran
Cyprus
China
India
Colombia
Argentina
Jordan
Bangladesh
Paraguay
South Africa
Chad
Rwanda

Country
1969
1987
1973
1978
1974
1950
1982
1963
1955
1970
1976
1947
1983
1994
1990

Year
0.326
0.346
0.365
0.366
0.367
0.375
0.376
0.377
0.381
0.395
0.397
0.401
0.409
0.412
0.414

AR2
0.023
0.051
0.047
0.021
0.061
0.067
0.067
0.053
0.075
0.053
0.083
0.058
0.049
0.103
0.080

AR0

Probs. (Civil War Onbserved)

0.028
0.051
0.041
0.021
0.071
0.073
0.072
0.061
0.077
0.059
0.072
0.081
0.026
0.109
0.100

CL1

Indonesia
Indonesia
Azerbaijan
Taijikistan
Russia
Burundi
Burundi
Indonesia
Pakistan
Turkey
Georgia
Pakistan
Indonesia
Rwanda
Indonesia

country

1952
1949
1991
1991
1998
1991
1992
1955
1970
1983
1991
1948
1963
1989
1962

Year

0.299
0.274
0.271
0.241
0.236
0.226
0.223
0.214
0.210
0.206
0.204
0.198
0.197
0.191
0.189

AR2

0.391
0.408
0.343
0.297
0.176
0.218
0.219
0.266
0.230
0.154
0.233
0.390
0.251
0.172
0.312

AR0

0.338
0.431
0.247
0.209
0.127
0.132
0.129
0.269
0.213
0.078
0.149
0.321
0.243
0.099
0.296

CL1

Probs. (Civil War NOT Observed)

Worst Predictions

Both “best predictions” and “worst predictions” are sorted based on the predictions of the GLMM-AR(2) model. Also, because the best 20
x, θθ) = 0.000, those probabilities are not listed in
predictions of those observation of non-civil war based on all the three models are Pr(y = 1|x,
the table.

Year

Country

Probs. (Civil War Observed)

Best Predictions

Table 3.2: Within-Sample Predictions of Civil War Onset

Figure 3.5: AutoCorrelation and Partial Autocorrelation of Predictive Prob.

10

15

5

10

15

ACF
0

5

10

-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

ACF
0

PORBIT

-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

ACF
5

GLMM-CL1

15

0

5

10

Lag

GLMM-AR(2)

GLMM-AR(0)

GLMM-CL1

PROBIT

15

5

10

15

Partial ACF

0.4

Partial ACF

0.6
10

Lag

0.2

Partial ACF
5

5

Lag

10

Lag

15

15

-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

Lag

-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

Lag

-0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2

Lag

-0.2 0.0

ACF

0

Partial ACF

GLMM-AR(0)

-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

GLMM-AR(2)

5

10

15

Lag

the GLMM-AR(2) model with the two alternative measures and compare them with
the results based on the previous measure. The summary of posterior means and 95%
credible intervals is presented in Table 3.3. The posteriors are symmetric with their
means very close to medians; therefore, I do not report the medians in the table.
The posteriors of the parameters in the individual-level regression are very similar
among the three models, and the dynamics of the error process is almost the same in
the three models. The average effect of EMR demonstrates differences with different
measures, but overall, its effect is uncertain in all models. Even though the average
effect of EMR is different, the degree that political instability alters EMR’s effect on
civil war onset is robust and has similar posteriors across models. For the other two
explanatory variables, average ethno-linguistic fractionalization and secondary school
enrollment, they seem to be more likely to decrease EMR’s effect on civil war onset
based on the two alternative measures than the measure adopted in the previous section. Figure 3.6 also shows that the country-specific effect of EMR on civil war onset,
as well as its variation across countries, are similar to those in Figure 3.2, only with
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Table 3.3: Robustness Check I: Alternative Measures of EMR

Measure I

Measure II

Measure III

Covariate

mean

credible interval

mean

credible interval

mean

credible interval

ρ1
ρ2
ongwar
gdpenl
lpopl
lmtnest
ncontig
oil
nwstate
instab
polity2
anocl
ethrac
EMR
minstab
methfrac
second

0.32
0.28
−1.15
−0.27
−0.20
0.12
0.72
0.58
0.64
0.15
0.02
0.13
−0.27
−0.49
2.76
0.17
−0.90

( 0.00 , 0.72)
(-0.11 , 0.57 )
(-1.78 , -0.58 )
(-0.39 , -0.15 )
(-0.43 , 0.19 )
(-0.01 , 0.27 )
( 0.10 , 1.37 )
( 0.09 , 1.11 )
( 0.15 , 1.13 )
(-0.14 , 0.43 )
(-0.01 , 0.04 )
(-0.17 , 0.42 )
(-1.21 , 0.68 )
(-1.47 , 0.48 )
( 0.58 , 5.09 )
(-1.15 , 1.43 )
(-3.78 , 1.86 )

0.34
0.32
−1.25
−0.27
−0.22
0.12
0.78
0.58
0.65
0.15
0.02
0.12
−0.22
−0.14
2.92
−0.08
−1.65

( 0.06 , 0.65 )
(-0.07 , 0.62 )
(-1.97 , -0.66 )
(-0.42 , -0.15 )
(-0.64 , 0.32 )
(-0.02 , 0.28 )
( 0.02 , 1.60 )
( 0.08 , 1.14 )
( 0.15 , 1.17 )
(-0.14 , 0.45 )
(-0.01 , 0.04 )
(-0.18 , 0.42 )
(-1.28 , 0.71 )
(-1.41 , 1.08 )
( 0.49 , 5.72 )
(-1.47 , 1.35 )
(-5.11 , 1.71 )

0.32
0.31
−1.23
−0.28
−0.21
0.11
0.76
0.59
0.65
0.15
0.02
0.13
−0.28
0.09
2.47
−0.17
−1.74

( 0.01 , 0.65 )
(-0.01 , 0.57 )
(-2.26 , -0.60 )
(-0.44 , -0.14 )
(-0.70 , 0.47 )
(-0.04 , 0.28 )
(-0.12 , 1.67 )
( 0.09 , 1.18 )
( 0.15 , 1.21 )
(-0.13 , 0.43 )
(-0.01 , 0.04 )
(-0.20 , 0.43 )
(-1.40 , 0.72 )
(-1.25 , 1.47 )
( 0.01 , 5.32 )
(-1.75 , 1.27 )
(-5.21 , 1.70 )

Marg. Lik.

−470.546

−476.891

−481.754

slightly bigger variations. The marginal likelihoods of the three models are reported
in Table 3.6, and they support the original measure over the two alternatives.
I also use the measure constructed by CG, N ∗ , and the modified N ∗ in FKL
which “uses dummies for whether the country had a minority EGIP (ethnic group(s)
in power) and whether the country had a coalition EGIP as coded by CG”. The
sample country-years then are limited to Eurasia and North Africa. The sample size
is 3327 with 85 countries across 55 years. The posteriors are summarized in Table 3.4.
Because some of the posterior distributions are skewed, I report both the means and
medians in the table. As in CG, political instability loses its importance in both
models, and democracy gains much importance based on the two measures. The
dynamic process of the errors is still similar to the one in the other models. With

83

3
2
1
-1

0

Unit-specific EMR

1
0
-1

Unit-specific EMR

2

3
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the heterogeneity in the two dimensions and serial correlation being modeled, even
the orginal N ∗ constructed by CG loses its importance on average, and there is not
much variation of its effect on civil war across countries (as shown in Figure 3.7).
No country-level explanatory variable demonstrates importance since there is not
much variation to explain. Because the two models have different response variables
from the previous models, they are not comparable. Thus, I omit reporting their
marginal likelihoods. This robustness check suggests that CG’s argument based on
their empirical models is not reliable.

84

Table 3.4: Robustness Check II: Different Measures of EMR

Measure I

Measure II

Covariate

mean

sd

median

credible interval

mean

sd

median

credible interval

ρ1
ρ2
ongwar
gdpenl
lpopl
lmtnest
ncontig
oil
nwstate
instab
polity2
anocl
ethrac
N∗
minstab
methfrac
second

0.34
0.45
−1.50
−0.29
−0.39
0.03
0.64
0.96
0.75
−0.06
0.04
0.09
0.06
0.53
1.01
−0.46
−0.83

0.16
0.19
0.59
0.13
1.74
0.36
1.43
0.50
0.46
0.25
0.02
0.27
1.38
2.00
2.83
2.54
2.99

0.32
0.47
−1.41
−0.31
−0.22
0.03
0.68
0.90
0.72
−0.05
0.04
0.09
0.36
0.70
1.04
−0.48
−0.87

( 0.07 , 0.71 )
( 0.04 , 0.77 )
(-2.79 , -0.56 )
(-0.50 , -0.08 )
(-5.45 , 3.92 )
(-0.84 , 0.77 )
(-3.74 , 3.67 )
( 0.11 , 2.19 )
(-0.09 , 1.75 )
(-0.58 , 0.42 )
(-0.01 , 0.09 )
(-0.44 , 0.61 )
(-4.13 , 1.76 )
(-4.61 , 4.01 )
(-4.64 , 6.51 )
(-5.39 , 4.64 )
(-6.58 , 5.11 )

0.31
0.47
−1.52
−0.30
−0.56
0.04
0.74
0.94
0.75
−0.09
0.04
0.11
0.07
−0.31
0.35
−0.46
0.20

0.17
0.20
0.61
0.12
1.68
0.34
1.30
0.47
0.46
0.26
0.02
0.27
1.37
1.83
2.77
2.59
2.96

0.29
0.50
−1.45
−0.30
−0.23
0.05
0.65
0.92
0.71
−0.09
0.04
0.12
0.37
−0.14
0.33
−0.47
0.24

( 0.03 , 0.75 )
( 0.01 , 0.77 )
(-2.86 , -0.51 )
(-0.51 , -0.02 )
(-5.36 , 2.13 )
(-0.82 , 0.68 )
(-2.20 , 3.89 )
( 0.06 , 1.96 )
(-0.08 , 1.78 )
(-0.62 , 0.39 )
(-0.01 , 0.09 )
(-0.45 , 0.63 )
(-4.08 , 1.77 )
(-4.87 , 2.91 )
(-5.18 , 5.71 )
(-5.51 , 4.65 )
(-5.72 , 5.94 )

3.7

Discussion

This chapter revisits the question about the relationship between minority ethnic
dominance on civil war onset raised by two recent papers in the civil war quantitative
study literature. With the complicated causal chain between the two variables, this
relationship is altered by multiple observed and unobserved background factors and
varies from country to country. This chapter applies a new model for empirical
analyses, which is not only able to directly model the varying degree of EMR’s effect
on civil war onset, but also carefully controls for multiple sources of confounding
caused by the TSCS data structure of the civil war dataset. The major findings
include the heterogeneity of EMR’s effect on civil war onset across countries, and the
countries with an unstable political regime are more prone to civil war when they
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are under ethnic minority rule than the politically stable countries are. This finding
is robust across different model specifications and alternative measures of EMR. In
addition, modeling the dynamic process of the errors and differentiating dynamics
from the heterogeneity in both year and country dimensions dramatically improve
statistical forecasts.
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Chapter 4
Sovereign Default: Regime Type,
Regime Duration, and
Vulnerability to Global Shocks

Is there a “democratic advantage” in sovereign borrowing from the international
financial market? The existing studies find mixed and ambiguous evidence about the
role of regime type, which may suggest that the relationship is actually nonlinear,
conditional on other factors, or confounded by omitted variables. In the decisionmaking about sovereign default, a government’s incentive of to pay back external debt
is important but complex (Drazen 1998). Various domestic political institutions, such
as regime type, veto power distribution, electoral system, and leadership turnover,
have been suggested to shape default incentive. Among those factors, regime type
is one of the most interesting but most controversial: despite the strong theories
supporting the “democratic advantage”, empirical evidence is often found that this
advantage does not apply to sovereign default. The null finding can be caused by
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both theoretical pitfalls and methodological discrepancies. Conventionally, regime
type is understood only as a distinct set of domestic institutions, and numerically
measured as spot values. However, the default decision involves the problem of time
inconsistency. Without analyzing the tradeoff between the present and the future, we
cannot really understand the role played by regime type. We should not understand
regime type only as a static set of institutional arrangements; instead, regime type
may affect how the shadow of the future forms and changes. This means that the
relationship between regime type and sovereign default may be more complex than
what the extant literature suggests.
Inspired by the theory constructed by Olson (1993) about how time horizons are
shaped through different mechanisms in different regimes as time goes by, this paper
re-investigates the effect of regime type on sovereign default by focusing on the regimedependent effect of regime duration. In addition, for both substantive and methodological reasons, sovereign default is explained in both the domestic and international
contexts. In the era of globalization, sovereign default crises are usually triggered
by macro shocks in the international system, and the variation of default propensity among countries is caused largely by the varying sensitivity and vulnerability of
countries to the international system. This has methodological importance, because
distinguishing the external sources of variation from the internal sources is necessary
for controlling for major confounders in the relationship between regime type and
sovereign default. It is also substantively interesting to empirically study in what degree and how differently globalization affects developing countries, which contributes
to the IR literature on how the international system affects national decision-making.
In this paper I make the following three arguments: (i) sovereign default is a
short-sighted decision which maintains the current consumption level at the expense
of future consumption, and the time horizon of a government plays an important
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role in sovereign default; (ii) regime duration affects of anocracies’ time horizons and,
accordingly, default likelihood, in a different way from the age of full democracies and
stark autocracies; and (iii) sovereign default as a national decision is largely affected by
external shocks in the international system which impact all countries but in varying
degrees. To empirically test the theoretical hypotheses, I collect time-series crosssectional data containing 134 developing countries in 14 years, and propose a new
method based on the data structure and research goals. By carefully controlling for
correlation in both the time and spatial dimensions and measuring the country-specific
impacts of common shocks, I find strong evidence supporting the regime-dependent
effect of regime duration and salient heterogeneity among countries in terms of their
sensitivity and vulnerability to globalization.

4.1

Sovereign Default, Time Horizons, and International System

Sovereign debt is distinct from corporate or individual debt in at leaset two aspects: the government commitment to repay external debt is unbinding in an anarchical international system; and, technically speaking, a country cannot be insolvent,
since the government always has avenues, mainly cutting expenditures or raising
taxes, to service external debt. Defaulting on sovereign debt is always a “decision”
made by politicians based on their cost-benefit calculation, subject to a variety of
internal and external constraints (Andritzky, 2006; Drazen, 2002, 1998; Bulow and
Rogoff, 1989). In this decision calculus, capability to pay is not the whole story: countries default in bad economic times, but the relationship between economic downturns
and sovereign default is surprisingly weak. Sovereign default has occurred when the
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economic situations are favorable (Tomz and Wright, 2007). Both willingness and
capacity matter in sovereign default, and are shaped by many economic and political
factors, domestically and internationally.

4.1.1

Why Countries Pay Back? Cost of Sovereign Default

Why does a government keep its commitment to repay external debt in spite of the
absence of a coercive authority above to force it to do it? In reality, most countries
at most of the time “voluntarily” stick to their debt obligations. The choice between
repaying and defaulting should be explained by the cost-benefit calculation of the
decision makers. The major benefit of sovereign default is to have breathing space
during a certain period of time. It allows the government to maintain or boost current
consumption by reducing the debt stock or extending the maturity of its repayments
(Paoli and Hoggarth, 2006), but sovereign default hurts economic development in the
long run for many reasons.
Sovereign default is bad for the reputation of the defaulting government, and it
takes time to rebuild market confidence. The defaulting country can be directly punished by international lenders. Although it remains controversial whether a defaulting
country is actually denied future access to the international financial market, empirical evidence confirms that future borrowing cost increases significantly for defaulting
countries (Paoli and Hoggarth, 2006). Higher cost of accessing the international
capital market has a negative impact on economic growth, especially for developing
countries which often have an under-developed domestic financial market and where
capital is a scarce resource. In addition, the “sovereign ceiling rule” states that the
private sector cannot borrow on better terms than the government in most situations
and in most countries. Sovereign default makes it more difficult for the private sector
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to borrow in the international financial market (Dooley, 2000). The private sector will
have to pay higher interest rates in international borrowing and face other worse conditions to access the market (Arteta and Hale, 2005). Furthermore, sovereign default
is likely to trigger banking and currency crises; as a consequence, it hurts the entire
domestic financial system deeply: the banking system in less developed countries are
fragile and vulnerable to debt crises because of the close and complicated connections
between the government and banks (Hoelscher and Quintyn, 2003). Sovereign default may also trigger speculative attacks on the currency of the defaulting country,
because debt crises send the signal to international speculators that the government
is less capable of defending its currency (Cespedes, Chang and Velasco, 2004). Paoli
and Hoggarth (2006) find that a twin or triple crisis has a larger effect on the fall in
output.
In general, the choice of sovereign default reflects that the government values current consumption rather than long-run economic growth and future taxable capacity
(Olson, 1993). Default can be regarded as distortionary taxation: taxing the future
for the present (Kim, 2007). If a government values current consumption more than
future consumption, it is more likely to choose default in bad economic times. Therefore, the incumbent government’s time horizon plays an important role in determining
its willingness to repay its external debt. In the IPE literature there are a variety of political institutions suggested to affect time horizons, such as electoral cycles (Alesina,
Roubini and Cohen, 1997; Mei and Guo, 2004), political instability (Bussiere and
Mulder, 1999; Bordo and Oosterlinck, 2005), regime type and tenure length of chief
executives (Clauge, Keefer and Olson, 1996; Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig,
2003; McGilivray and Smith, 2003; Demir, 2006; Moser, 2006; Chang, 2002). Most of
them share a coherent underlying logic that if the incumbent government has a shorter
time horizon, it tends to make short-sighted decisions such as sovereign default.
91

4.1.2

Time Horizons: Regime-Dependent Effect of Regime
Duration

Time horizon affects a government’s choice between repaying and defaulting on
its external debt, since there is a time inconsistency problem. Some address this
time horizon issue in sovereign default by focusing on different mechanisms through
which citizens punish defaulting political leaders under various regimes (McGilivray
and Smith, 2003), and others explain sovereign default as a short-sighted decision of
opportunistic politicians with short time horizons (Demir, 2006; Moser, 2006; Bordo
and Oosterlinck, 2005; Mei and Guo, 2004; Chang, 2002; Balkan, 1992; Ozler and
Tabellini, 1991). However, those studies suffer from difficulties in controlling for
various sources of confounding. For example, leadership turnover is suggested to
affect the time horizon of the decision makers (McGilivray and Smith, 2003), but
there are many different forms of leader change. The Archigos Database categorizes
at least four different situations of leadership turnover, namely, leadership turnover
in a regular manner, in an irregular manner, through direct removal by another
state, and as a result of a natural death (Goemans, Gieditsch and Chiozza, 2009).
Leadership turnover does not necessarily mean that the leader at the end of her tenure
has a short time horizon regardless of regime type. In democracies, the politician at
the end of her tenure may still value the future, because she or her party expects to
take office again in the future. A dictator in power transition may still care about the
long-run benefits, because she is confident that the successor she chooses will stay in
power for a long time or because a strong dominant party forces her to be responsible.
This paper focuses on time horizons to explain sovereign default. It differentiates
itself from existing studies by investigating the regime-dependent effect of regime duration. Regime type is one of the most interesting political factors in the literature on
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sovereign borrowing and other important IPE questions. Most existing studies stress
the constraints imposed by regime-specific institutions on sovereign default and analytically reach the conclusion that democracies are less likely to default on their
external debt than autocracies and the commitment made by democracies is more
credible (Schultz and Weingast, 2003; Tsebelis, 2002; Schultz, 2001; Olson, 2000; Elster, 2000; Smith, 1998; Weingast, 1997, 1995; Fearon, 1994; Firmin-Sellers, 1994;
Olson, 1993; Przeworksi and Limongi, 1993; Shepsle, 1991; North, 1989, 1990; North
and Weingast, 1989; McGilivray and Smith, 2003; Balkan, 1992; Brewer and Rivoli,
1990; Citron and Nickelsburg, 1987; Abdullah, 1985; Feder and Uy, 1985). However,
empirical analyses often fail to support the “democratic advantage” in sovereign borrowing, and the effect of regime type on international capital flow remains controversial (Jensen, 2008; Archer, Biglaiser and DeRouen, 2007; Saiegh, 2005; Jensen, 2003;
Li and Resnick, 2003; Sobel, 1999). Null findings are not particular to the studies on
politics of international finance; in the broader literature on regime type and economic
growth, empirical evidence is also very ambiguous, and a democracy is often found to
even have a slightly negative effect (Krieckhaus, 2004; Feng, 2003; Przeworski et al.,
2002; Tavares and Wacziarg, 2001; Przeworski et al., 2000; Barro, 1996; Levine and
Renelt, 1992), despite widely-accepted theories supporting democracy as an optimal
form for economic growth. This has puzzled many researchers. Some argue that it
is misleading to treat “democracy” as a static set of institutions and measure it as
a spot value. In a country with a long history of democracy, democratic institutions
are deeply embedded, and the country will behave differently from a new democracy.
Based on this criticism, Gerring et al. (2005) use a cumulative measure of democracy
as a stock rather than level, and find empirical support that the effect of regime type
on economic growth is conditional on regime duration.
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Olson (1982) and Olson (1993) noticed the regime-dependent effect of regime
duration on economic development. According to Olson, democracies are subject
to “institutional sclerosis” as time goes by, because groups with special interests
weaken “encompassing interests” and are becoming better at capturing the state and
seeking for rents. In this sense, authoritarian regime enjoys the advantage of more
encompassing power. Nonetheless, Olson also argues that this “autocracy advantage”
is duration-dependent. Only when the ruler expects the regime to survive in the
future, she can have a long time horizon. How long the regime has already been
provides important information about the prospective of regime survival in the future.
From the perspective of time horizons, Olson’s theory predicts that for autocracies
with longer regime duration, the ruler is more confident on future regime survival
and has longer time horizon, and consequently is less likely to make short-sighted
decisions. This is also confirmed by the empirical evidence in Clague et al. (1997).
Without much modification, this argument is applied to sovereign default: when an
authoritative regime is perceived to last for a long time, the dictator has incentive to
ensure future output and consumption, and is less likely to default on external debt.
However, Olson’s theory about the effect of regime age for democracies emphasizes
dynamic institutional changes instead of time horizons. His theory predicts that with
longer regime duration, because of weakened “encompassing interests”, a democratic
government tends to make short-sighted decisions. However, this does not apply to
sovereign default, about which the configuration of special interests of “small groups”
is unclear. The dominance of small groups’ interests does not necessarily mean that
the government is biased towards defaulting on its external debt. If the dominant
small groups borrow heavily from the international financial market, it is their interest
to ensure an easy and stable access to future financing. The benefit of default is
usually diffuse and the cost concentrated to small groups (Celasun and Harms, 2007;
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Block and Schrage, 2003), so the dominance of small group interests is more likely
to lead to sticking to debt obligations, though the interests of dominant groups can
be rather heterogeneous across countries and time. In spite of the ambiguity in the
analysis on small group interests in democracies, by focusing on the supply side of
economic policies, the time horizon of the government in a stable democracy will
be longer than in a new and immature democracy. Parties and individual politicians
expect that the rules of the game remain stable in the future, and their record matters
when they are trying to win the next election. Therefore, for both full democracies
and stark autocracies with a longer regime age, the regime is expected to be more
likely to survive in the future, and the government has a longer time horizon, values
more the future, and is less likely to default on its external debt.
Besides democracies and autocracies, there is another important type of regime
called anocracies. Hegre et al. (2001) define anocracies as “semi-democracies” that are
“partly open yet somewhat repressive,” distinguished from “institutionally consistent
democracies and stark autocracies.” Fearon and Laitin (2003) also describe anocracies as a mixed regime of a democracy with autocratic features. Vreeland (2008)
characterizes this regime as “a mix of institutional characteristics, some democratic
and others distinctively authoritarian.” Since anocracies are an intermediate state
between full democracies and stark autocracies (Baliga, Lucca and Sjöström, 2009),
by definition and by nature, anocracies are an unstable regime in the middle (Rost,
Schneider and Kleibl, 2009), and are at a transitory stage (Goetze and Guzina, 2008).
“[A] key feature of anocracies is that they are relatively unstable and that instability is often associated with a shift to autocracy or democracy... [Anocracies] denote
a transitional and potentially unstable stage on the way to more stable democratic
governance (or state failure)” (Elgie and McMenamin, 2008). Anocracies’ characteristic of being highly transitory is also reflected by empirical evidence. For example,
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Marshall and Gurr (2003) find, among all ancroacies, “over fifty percent experiencing
a major regime change within five years and over seventy percent within ten years.”
Because anocracies are transitory, regime duration of annocracies has different
implications to sovereign default. Annocracies are expected to last for a short period
of time; as time goes by, regime change is expected more likely to occur in either
direction. No matter whether it changes to be more democratic or more authoritarian,
the expected change causes high political uncertainty and shortens the time horizon of
the incumbent government. It is highly uncertain whether the incumbent government
is still in power after a major regime change, and the incumbent government will
value less future income and consumption, ceteris paribus. From the perspective of
time horizons, the age of an anocracy will increase the likelihood that the incumbent
government chooses sovereign default rather than repaying external debt by increasing
taxes or cuting expenditures in order to avoid output loss caused by sovereign default.
In all, because sovereign default is a short-sighted decision to maintain the current
consumption level at the expense of future consumption, incumbent governments with
longer time horizons will be less likely to default on their external debts. In full
democracies and stark autocracies, longer regime duration stabilizes the expectation
of regime survival and regime stability in the future, and the government values more
future consumption and is less likely to make short-sighted decisions such as defaulting
on external debt; but for anocracies which are intrinsically transitory and unstable,
with longer regime duration, a major regime change is expected to be more likely,
and the government will have a shorter time horizon and tend to make opportunistic
decisions.
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4.1.3

External Shocks and Heterogeneous Sensitivity to International System

There is no need to argue that sovereign default is largely triggered by external
shocks in the international system1 . However, the IPE literature on sovereign borrowing focuses on domestic economic and political institutions; besides time dummies
used for controlling for unobserved common shocks, only several observed common
shocks in the international system are included in empirical studies as control variables, such as global GDP growth, US interest rate, default proportion (Kim, 2008;
Kraay and Nehru, 2006; Saiegh, 2004). More importantly, both observed and unobserved global shocks are assumed to have unit-invariant impacts despite the salient
heterogeneities among sample countries. This assumption is unrealistic because the
pressure of external events is filtered or cushioned by domestic political, economic,
and social characteristics, and will affect domestic policy-making in different ways.
Modeling unit-varying effects of common shocks is not only methodologically desirable (I will discuss this in more detail in the next section), but also has important
theoretical meaning for understanding sovereign default by taking account of countries’ vulnerability to financial globalization. For less developed but open economies,
the effects of global shocks can be considerably large and vary widely across countries.
Without analyzing the international factors together with domestic institutional variables, both inferences and forecasting would be misleading.
In the era of globalization, “the world is now really a single economy in the macroeconomic sense (Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1992).” Complex interdependence shrinks national
control of resources and erodes the autonomy of national governments (Berger, 2000).
1

Here international system is not formally defined as in the IR literature (primarily the definition
given by Waltz (1979)); instead, it is informally referred to and broadly defined as a group of
interacting, interrelated, or interdependent countries forming a complex whole
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We can no longer understand national policy-making without putting it in the international context (Keohane and Milner, 1996). Common shocks in the international
system, such as global macroeconomic changes, establishment of new economic and
political rules, technological development, and so on, create new opportunities but
also imposes new constraints on nation-states (Frieden and Rogowski, 1996). More
than three decades ago, Gourevitch (1978) invented the term, “the second image reversed”, and raised a series of research questions about how international factors affect
domestic economy and politics and whether the shocks in the system have the same
impacts everywhere. Gourevitch (1986) showed, by using case studies, large variation
across countries of domestic responses reflected by economic policies under the pressure of external shocks. In the paradigm of “the second image reversed” (Keohane
and Milner, 1996), there has been a huge IPE literature on how globalization affects
national decision making (Pierson, 1996; Williamson, 1997; Kapstein, 2000; Rudra,
2002; Schmukler, 2004; Wibbels and Arce, 2003; Wibbels, 2006, to name only a few).
Most of them use qualitative research since empirically measuring how the effects of
both observed and unobserved common shocks vary is methodologically challenging.
The international financial market is integrated in a complex way compared with
other aspects of globalization. Financial globalization is “the integration of countries
into international financial markets,” posing complex problems and challenges to all
countries, especially developing countries (Torre, Yeyati and Schmukler, 2002). The
financial connections among countries are vulnerable to shocks within and outside the
financial sector. Many scholars are interested in studying how financial globalization
affects national decision making differently given different domestic institutions. A
good example is the classical Mundell-Fleming model, which establishes a framework
to analyze how international capital flow affects domestic policy making (monetary
policy) conditional on other domestic institutions (exchange rate regime). Focus98

ing more on less-developed countries, Torre, Yeyati and Schmukler (2002) emphasize
three domestic factors, international currency, flexible exchange rate, and sound contractual and regulatory environment, which together are called the “blessed trinity”.
They use this “blessed trinity” to explain why some countries benefit from financial globalization, but others handle volatility in the international financial market
less successfully. The large literature on spillover and contagion of financial crises is
essentially about how external shocks affect countries in globalization through real
links, financial links, and imperfect information and sentiments in the international
capital market (Cuadra and Sapriza, 2008; Demir, 2006; Dungey and Martin, 2005;
Hedge and Paliwal, 2005; Calvo, 2005; Lizarazo, 2005; Abreu, 2003; Giannetti, 2003;
Gelos and Wei, 2002; Change and Majnoni, 2001; Kawai, Newfarmer and Schmukler, 2001; Bordo and Murshid, 2000; Calvo and Mendoza, 1998; Calvo and Reinhart,
1996; Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch, 1992). There is very little controversy that the risks and rewards of globalization, especially for developing
countries, vary widely from country to country, according to their sensitivity and
vulnerability to the international system (Kenen, 2007; Kose et al., 2006).
The financial market is subject to various shocks, some of which are tangible,
such as macroeconomic shocks (global economic situations), financial shocks (e.g.,
changes of liquidity), political shocks (e.g., wars), institutional shocks (e.g., establishment or demise of international organizations), and natural shocks (e.g., natural
disasters); others, though, are intangible shocks, such as a sentiment shift of international investors, herding behavior caused by market and information imperfection,
and changes of international pressure on servicing external debt (the peer pressure).
External shocks affect decisions about sovereign default, and the relationship is altered by domestic factors and through various channels. If an empirical analysis had
been able to include all the relevant mediate domestic factors, we would not be con99

cerned about the direct effects of external shocks, but the channels through which
the external pressure transforms into domestic policy making are too complicated to
be identified or included. It is also unrealistic to include all common shocks in our
theoretical framework and empirical models. Therefore, when analyzing sovereign
default, we always face the omitted variable problem. Furthermore, as mentioned
before, the effect of financial globalization is likely to vary from country to country,
and it is not easy to model the varying level of vulnerability or sensitivity of countries’
decision making regarding sovereign default to common shocks.

4.2

Variables and Data

To test the regime-specific effect of regime age and to analyze the unit-varying
impact of the international system on national decision of sovereign default, I collect
data of 134 developing countries from 1990 to 2003. In this section, I describe the
definition, measurement, and descriptive characteristics of the variables.

4.2.1

Dependent Variable: Sovereign Default

In the literature, there are several different ways to determine and measure sovereign
default. Moody’s Investors Service (1999) defines sovereign default as “(1) any missed
or delayed payment of interest and/or principal, or (2) any exchange where the debtor
offers the creditor a new contract that amounts to a diminished financial obligation,
or (3) where the exchange has the apparent purpose of helping the borrower avoid
default.” Similarly, in academia, sovereign default usually refers to rescheduling
or restructuring debt, including arrears on principal or interests (Reinhart, Rogoff
and Savastano, 2003; van Rijicheghem and Weder, 2004; Kraay and Nehru, 2006;
Kohlscheen, 2006; Tomz and Wright, 2007; Saiegh, 2008). In the present paper, I
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follow a widely-applied definition and measurement: sovereign default is an event in
which a sovereign fails to make pre-scheduled principal or interest payment or restructures its external debt. As in Kim (2008), the two criteria used to measure an episode
of sovereign default are the accumulation of debt payment arrears and a rescheduling arrangement. The variable, Default, is measured as the same in Kim (2008): a
country-year is coded as 1 “if the increase in the stock of total arrears exceeds 2% of
total debt from private creditors or if the total amount of debt rescheduled exceeds
2.5% of total debt from private creditors unless the stock of total arrears decreases
by more than the amount of debt rescheduled in the same year, and 0 otherwise.”
The data are from Global Development Finance (GDF 2005).
The sample year starts from 1990 due to the large amount of missing data before.
There are 134 developing countries in the dataset from 1990 to 2003. The data structure is unbalanced: the minimum number of observations of a country is 3 (Bosnia
and Herzegovina), and the maximum number is 14 (97 countries); the average number
of observations of a country is 12.70 (the median is 14) with standard deviation 2.52.
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In the cross-section dimension, the minimum number of observations in a year is 102,
and the maximum is 133. In average 123 countries are observed in a year with standard deviation 11.00. There are 1718 country-years in the dataset, and 217 default
episodes are observed, a proportion of 12.60% 2 . For more information about the
sample countries and years, see Appendix 4.6.4. Figure 4.1 presents the default rate
of the sample countries and years. The left figure shows that there are 53 countries
which do not default even once in their sample time period, and the country that
defaulted most frequently (in about 70% of its sample years) is Jordan. The right
graph illustrates the proportion of defaulting countries in a given year. The default
rate roughly decreases between 1990 and 2000. There is a surge in 2001, when about
30% of the sample countries default. The default rate remains high in 2002 (about
23%), and then back to around the average level in 2003.

4.2.2

Regime Type, Regime Duration, and External Shocks

There are three different regime types under investigation in this paper, namely,
democracy, anocracy, and autocracy. In the Polity IV database, the variable polity2
measures the degree of democracy as 21-scale scores ranging from −10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic) (Marshall and Jaggers, 2007). This measure
is used here as the variable Democracy in the model to estimate the effect of the level
of democracy. To test the regime-specific effect of regime duration, I use a discrete
measure for the three types and, following the most used coding criterion in the literature such as Gurr et al (Polity V), Fearon and Laintin (2003) and many others:
2

I tried to use alternative coding criteria as in Kim (2008), but based on the current data set the
thresholds of 4% or 6% for arrears and 5% or 7.5% for rescheduled debt generate sovereign default as
a rare event (6.35% and 4.19%, respectively). Since rare events requires special analytical methods,
I do not use those alternative measures in this paper.
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based on the polity2 score in Polity IV, I code the regime authority years with a
polity score between −5 and +5 as “anocracies”(coded as 1), and those with scores
falling out of this range as “non-anocracies”(coded as 0), including full democracies
(between +6 and +10) and stark autocracies (between −10 and −6). Alternative
coding criteria are also used, though less frequently, in the literature: since “anocracies” are understood as a regime “in the middle”, some studies use equal-lengthed
subintervals to define autocracies, anocracies, and democracies, and coded regime
authority years with polity scores between −3 and 3 as anocracies (Relter and Meek,
1999; Baliga, Lucca and Sjöström, 2009). I use this alternative coding criterion as a
robustness check. Using the coding criterion of [−5, 5], there are 643 country-years
of anocracies, a proportion of 37.4%. For the anocracy group, regime duration is 8.3
years on average, while countries in the group of full democracy and autocracy last for
17.0 years on average before a major regime change occurs. The t-test rejects the null
hypothesis that the two groups have the same mean regime duration. Alternatively,
if using the subinterval of [−3, 3], 361 country-years are anocracies, a proportion of
18%. The anocracy group has average regime duration as 7.93 years, and the group
of full democracies and autocracies as 15.3 years. The t-test also rejects the null
hypothesis. In both cases, we can see that anocracies are transitory and last for a
much shorter time period than both democracies and autocracies.
The measure of regime duration is based on the variable durable in Polity IV,
which has been used to measure regime/political stability in many empirical studies
in political science (Gartzke, 2001; Fearon and Laitin, 2003b; Fearon, Kasara and
Laitin, 2007; Calderon and Chong, 2007; Vreeland, 2008; Chang and Golden, 2009,
for instance). It is defined in the Polity IV User’s Manual (p.13) as following:
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Regime Durability: the number of years since the most recent regime
change (defined by a three- point change in the POLITY score over a
period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the
lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority
score). In calculating the DURABLE value, the first year during which
a new (post-change) polity is established is coded as the baseline “year
zero” (value = 0) and each subsequent year adds one to the value of the
DURABLE variable consecutively until a new regime change or transition
period occurs.
From the definition we can see that this variable directly measures the age of a
regime before a major regime change occurs and is the actual regime duration. There
is another variable, regime “durability”, which is often used to measure the time
horizon associated with regime survival. One way to measure regime “durability” is
to use a regression model (survival analysis, for example) to estimate the survival
probability of a regime at each time period (Wright, 2008). I do not use this variable
or apply the estimated regime survival probability for two major reasons. First, the
regime durability is a related but different concept from regime duration or regime
age. Although regime duration is closely associated with the expected regime survival
probability, it is essentially a cumulative measure and based on the whole history
of a certain regime, but the estimated survival probability is a spot value in each
time period, responding to the changes of other relevant situations and probably
being affected by the dynamics (what happened in the previous one or two time
periods). The second reason is that the survival probability is an estimates based
on a particular regression model, and the measure’s quality completely depends on
correctly specifying the model and how well the model predicts regime changes. The
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better the prediction, the better the measure. This means that the model is likely to
be over-fitted and include most of the variables to be selected in the sovereign default
model. This will confound the relationships of major interest. In addition, to include
the uncertainty of the predicted probability is difficult, but ignoring the uncertainty
and arbitrarily picking up point values make the measure misleading.

4.2.3

Macroeconomic Situations and Global Shocks

There are several macroeconomic variables widely regarded to have effects on the
capability of a government to repay external debt. The ratio of external debt to
output measures how deep a country is in debt and its capability to repay debt. The
higher the ratio, the higher the expected default likelihood. GDP per capita reflects
the economic development level of a country. Richer countries should be more capable of sticking to debt obligations, but for developing countries, those that are more
deeply involved in the international economy are likely to be richer than those that
are not, but more sensitive and vulnerable to the changes in the system. Therefore,
GDP per capita may have an ambiguous effect. The rate of output growth can also
be an important predictor of sovereign default, because a decline of GDP growth
causes a long-term insolvency problem. Trade openness has been suggested to reduce
the probability of sovereign default, because the more open the economy, the more
costly sovereign default, since international creditors can impose punishment on international trade of the defaulting country. However, the creditors in the commercial
market are not necessarily those in the financial market, and the former may not
have incentive to punish a defaulting country. The effect of trade openness could
be negative or uncertain. A large proportion of short-term debt in a country’s debt
stock, a low level of foreign exchange reserve relative to external debt stock, and a
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Table 4.1: Within-Group Variation of Variables)
Symbol

Individual
Mean

Default
Duration
Democracy
Annocracy
Total Debt/GDP (t−1 , log)
GDP per capita (t−1 , log)
GDP Growth (t−1 )
Trade Openness (t−1 , log)
Short-term Debt/Total Debt (t−1 , log)
Reserves/Total Debt (t−1 , log)
Current Account (t−1 )
World GDP Growth
US Interest Rate

SD

0.126 0.332
13.749 17.380
1.796 6.296
0.153 0.360
11.406 1.919
6.855 1.170
1.517 6.281
3.342 0.658
2.003 1.325
2.742 1.414
−0.325 4.139
3.192 0.889
7.569 1.816

Within-Country

Within-Year

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

0.207
7.280
1.920
0.204
0.194
0.203
4.090
0.196
0.665
0.403
2.890

0.328
17.400
6.250
0.358
1.930
1.170
6.000
0.655
1.310
1.400
3.720

0.062
1.440
0.204
0.022
0.081
0.025
1.680
0.052
0.183
0.161
1.600

0.232
8.430
3.580
0.187
0.244
0.151
4.810
0.238
0.652
0.631
1.480

high ratio of current account deficit to GDP are all dangerous signs, because the
country is more prone to liquidity debt crises (Min et al., 2003; Rodrik and Velasco,
1999; Jeanne, 1997; Sachs, 1984). The economic data are mainly from the IMF and
Work Bank data bases, and are lagged for one time period to avoid the simultaneity
problem. All variables and their variation at both the individual and group levels are
summarized in Table 4.2.
For observed common shocks, I simply include the two most used variables: US
interest rate and global GDP growth. Global GDP growth represents the global
macroeconomic situation in a given year and the output shocks in the international
system. Changes in the US prime interest rate reflect the fluctuation of international
liquidity and the general cost of international borrowing. Figure 4.2 shows a simple
univariate analysis of the relationship between default rate and regime type, regime
duration, global GDP growth, and US interest. Without controlling for other variables, being more democratic seems not to have a linear relationship with higher
default rate, but regime duration is negatively correlated with sovereign default rate.
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While World GDP growth rate may reduce sovereign default, increase of US interest
is associated with higher default rate.

4.3

Methodology

The response variable, sovereign default, is dichotomous and time-series crosssectional. The data characteristics mean that to investigate the relationships of theoretical interest, several methodological issues have to be handled with caution. First,
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the 135 sample countries, though all less developed economies, are saliently different
in many important aspects. Country-specific characteristics may affect sovereign default and be correlated with the covariates at the same time. Omitted heterogeneities
are likely to lead to inconsistent as well as inefficient estimators. Second, each sample
country is repeatedly measured over time, and serial correlation is a natural concern.
There are multiple sources of inter-temporal correlations, including dynamics in the
financial market, path dependence of states and investors’ behavior, policy inertia,
measurement error, and omitted variables, etc. Unmodeled or uncorrected serial
correlation will cause biased or inconsistent estimates of standard errors. Third, to
investigate the country-specific effect of globalization is methodologically challenging:
for observed common shocks we can use country-specific coefficients, but most common shocks are not measured. How, then, can we estimate the unit-varying effects of
the unobserved common shocks?

4.3.1

Methodological Issues

Observations of the same country are likely to be correlated because of countryspecific characteristics and dynamics. Those of the same year may also be related:
changes in the international system have impacts on all the countries albeit at different levels; and interactions among countries cause spillover of debt crises across
borders. Hence, observations of the 134 countries in the 14 years are clustered in
both the time and spatial dimensions, which suggests multilevel analysis to handle
heterogeneity and different sources and levels of variation (Gelman and Hill, 2006;
Gill, 2007; Beck and Katz, 2007; Shor et al., 2007). For the serial correlation issue,
the lagged variable approach (including lagged values of response variables (observed
or latent) and explanatory variables (LDVs/LIDVs)) have been often recommended
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and implemented (Beck, Katz and Tucker, 1998; Beck et al., 2002), but those methods cannot substitute for direct error serial dependence correction. Because there
are multiple sources of intertemporal correlation, serial dependence may be partially
corrected by LDVs or LIDVs, but they cannot speak to whether the errors are still
correlated. In addition, for generalized linear models, including lagged values of observed response variable does not introduce the same error covariance matrix as a
same order autoregressive errors, but lagged values of the latent response variable
raise several potential theoretical and methodological problems (Wilson and Butler,
2007; Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2008), and are as complex to estimate as a model
with a dynamic error process.
In this paper, modeling the impacts of common shocks is not only substantively
interesting but also has methodological importance. Longitudinal analysis usually focuses on studying dynamic relationships and heterogeneity among units (Molenberghs
and Verbeke, 2005; Frees, 2004; Verbeke and Molenberghs, 2000). For the sovereign
default data analyzed in the current paper, concerns about heterogeneity and correlation are naturally extended to the cross-section dimension, since the observations
of all countries are sampled at equally spaced time periods (Gelman, 2006). Crosssectional correlation can be caused by many sources, such as omitted common shocks,
spillover or contagion (spatial effects), or interactions among units (network effects)
(Pesaran, 2006). Spatial correlation, just like serial dependence, yields misleading
inferences if standard panel models are applied. When omitted common effects are
correlated with the regressors, we will have an endogeneity problem and, as a consequence, inconsistent estimators (Philips and Sul, 2003).
How to solve this problem depends on the data structure and the substantive
question to answer. If the unit dimension is much smaller than the time dimenstion,
i.e., N << T , TSCS data can be treated as a seemingly unrelated system, and gen109

eralized least squares is applied. This is apparently not the case for the sovereign
default data in this paper: with the cross-section dimension much larger than the
time dimension, SUR analysis cannot apply. Two major alternative specifications
have been used to model spatial correlation for such a data structure (N >> T ). One
approach includes spatial regressions, such as spatial autoregressive, moving average,
and spatial error component models. Spatial regressions are based on the assumption
that correlation among units is determined by a pre-specified metric based on geographical, economic, social, political or other kinds of distance among units (Franzse
and Hays, 2008b, 2007; Pesaran, Schuermann and Weiner, 2004; Conley and Topa,
2002; Conley, 1999). They are often applied to the substantive and methodological
issues caused by spillover or interactions. However, because of complex interdpendence in the era of globalization, we do not have the prior information required for
specifying the metric, since geographical distance has lost its conventional meaning,
and the distance in other senses, such as economic distance or social distance, is not
clearly defined and remains controversial.
An alternative approach is the multifactor residual model, focusing on spatial
correlation caused by common shocks in varying degrees for different units. Unlike
ordinary mixed-effect models, the multifactor model admits that, due to heterogeneity
among units, the impacts of common factors vary from unit to unit. The residual
term in the model includes two parts: the linear combination of unobserved common
factors with their particular impacts on each unit, and an idiosyncratic error term.
Because of the substantive interest of this paper and the purpose of keeping the
statistical model from being too complicated, I do not consider spillover effects at the
same time.
Conventionally, the multifactor residual model is estimated with a full maximum
likelihood procedure (Robertson and Symons, 2000) or principal component analy110

sis (Coakley, Fuertes and Smith, 2002). For those estimators to be consistent, an
aditional assumption is required: regressors are uncorrelated with the unobserved
common factors. Since this assumption is too restrictive in empirical studies, there
are several methods in the literature used to allow the time-specific disturbances to
be correlated with the covariates, such as linear panel models with instrumental variables (Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen, 1988), generalized methods of moments (Ahn,
Lee. and Schmidt, 2001), and least squares with auxiliary regressions, also referred to
as common correlation effects estimators (Pesaran, 2006; Pesaran and Tosetti, 2007).
With a multilevel specification, those frequentist and likelihoodist approaches suffer
from complications, especially when developing asymptotic properties of the estimators. In this paper, I take advantage of a Markov Chain Monte Carlo method and
develop a more straightfoward Bayesian estimator.

4.3.2

GLMM-TSUV.AR(p): Specification and Estimation

This subsection specifies the generalized linear multilevel model with time-specific
unit-varying effects and an autoregressive idiosyncratic error term (henceforth, GLMMTSUV.AR(p) ), and addresses the Bayesian strategy of model estimation and comparison.
Suppose the data consist of N units each of which is indexed as i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }.
Unit i has Ti observations in time periods {1i , ..., ti , ..., Ti } ⊆ {1, 2, ..., T }. With the
contemporary effects modeled, index ti = t means that yi,ti is observed in year t.
Since the data structure is unbalanced, the observation yi,ti is not necessarily the tth
element in {1i , ..., ti , ..., Ti } and it is likely that ti 6= tj and Ti 6= Tj for i 6= j. By
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using the latent variable approach (Albert and Chib, 1993), the general specification
of GLMM-TSUV.AR(p) is as follows:

yi,ti = 1(zi,ti > 0),

(4.1)

0
zi,ti = x01i,ti β 1 + wi,t
β 2i + v 0i,ti β 3ti + ζi,ti + ξi,ti ,
i

(4.2)

β 2i = A1i β 2 + b1i ,

β 3ti = Uti β 3 + η ti ,

ζi,ti = s0ti β 4i + ft0i γ i ,

(4.3)

β 4i = A2i β 4 + b2i ,

fti = f + cti ,

γ i = γ + ζ i,

(4.4)

ξi,ti = ρ1 ξi,ti −1 + ... + ρp ξi,ti −p + i,ti .

(4.5)

Unlike ordinary generalized linear multi-level models, this model has a parameter ζi,ti
measuring the country-specific effect of the international system. This effect is further
decomposed into two parts in the third equation of line (4.3): the unit-varying impacts
of the observed common shocks s (a q1 -dimensional vector) and the unobserved ones
f (a q2 -dimensional vector). Both the observed and unobserved common shocks are
called factors in this model, and Fti ≡ (sti , fti ) is a factor vector, and Γ ≡ (β 4i , γ i )
is the vector of factor loadings which measure the unit-specific effects of the common
shocks. In the model the unobserved factors are treated as latent variables distributed
as fti ∼ N (f , Ωfti ) and their factor loadings γ i ∼ N (γ, Σγ i ) (as in the last two
equations of line (4.4)). However, these general distribution assumptions make the
effects of the factor loadings unidentifiable. If all of the overall, time-specific, and
unit-specific intercepts are included, then, with essentially no loss of generality, we
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can instead assume fti ∼ N (00, Ωfti ) and γ i ∼ N (00, Σγ i ). The identifiable model can
be written as follows:

yi,ti = 1(zi,ti > 0),

(4.6)

0
zi,ti = x01i,ti β 1 + wi,t
β 2i + v 0i,ti β 3ti + s0ti β 4i + ft0i γ i + ξi,ti ,
i

(4.7)

β 2i = A1i β 2 + b1i ,

(4.8)

β 3ti = Uti β 3 + η ti ,

ξi,ti = ρ1 ξi,ti −1 + ... + ρp ξi,ti −p + i,ti .

β 4i = A2i β 4 + b2i ,

(4.9)

As in the general multilevel model for TSCS data (Pang, 2009), there are three
different types of individual-level covariates: x with fixed effect coefficients, w with
unit-specific effects, and v with time-specific effects, all of which contain a constant
term. The variations of unit- and time-specific effects may be further explained
by observed unit- and time-specific characteristics and unobserved random effects
as in the first two equations of line (4.8). I relax the unrealistic assumption that
the common shocks have unit-invariant effects and allow each unit to have its own
coefficients β 4i for the observed global shocks and γ i for the unobserved ones. The
variation of β 4i may be future explained with a matrix of predictors, A2 , which can be
the same as A1 or its subset or contain a different set of unit-level predictors. With the
assumption that fti and γ i are distributed with mean 0 , the term ft0i γ is a component
of the overall residual term in equation (4.7). The idiosyncratic error ξi,ti follows
a pth order autoregressive process to correct serial correlation. The reduced form
of this model is just a standard multifactor residual model (m factor loadings) with
0
autoregressive errors. To see it more clearly, set Xi,ti = (x1,iti , wi,t
A1i , v 0ti Uti , sti A2i ),
i
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β = (β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , β 4 ) (K1 dimensions), Wi,ti = (wi,ti , sti ), and bi = (b1i , b2i )(K2
dimensions), and

0
zi,ti = X0i,ti β + Wi,t
b + v 0i,ti η ti + ft0i γ i + ξi,ti
i i

(4.10)

ξi,ti = ρ1 ξi,ti −1 + ... + ρp ξi,ti −p + i,ti .

(4.11)

Normally the factors f have no direct theoretical interpretation, and the decision of
how many factors to be included is not made based on substantive consideration
(Lord and Novick, 1968; Mulaik, 1988a,b; Skrondal and Laake, 2001). The so-called
Kaiser-Guttmann criterion is often applied for estimation reasons, which requires the
number of factors be equal to the number of eigenvalues of the correlation matrix
that are larger than one. With latent response variables and complex covariance
matrices, this criteria is difficult to apply, and the choice of the number of factors is
often ad hoc (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004, pp.63-71). In empirical models we
can always increase the dimension of f and investigate how the results differ from a
lower dimensional f , and further apply information-based criteria to determine the
number of factors which makes the model fit the data better. This model is also a
two-way mixed effects model, but no assumption of independence between random
coefficients is needed; this assumption is normally required in standard two-way mixed
effects models (Weerahandi, 2004, p.107-113). Finally, we need another assumption
to identify the parameters of γ . Two identification strategies are often adopted in
the literature of multifactor residual models, namely, “anchoring” (set γ 1 = 1 ) and
P
2
“factor standardization” (set N
n=1 γi = 1). The “anchoring” method is preferred
because it achieves “factorial invariance” (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004, pp.67),
which is adopted in this paper.
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Although the model is very general, it is difficult to estimate because of multiple
sources of correlation in different dimensions in this model. Philips and Sul (2003)
apply a GLS-SURE method for an autoregressive linear model with random coefficients, but their approach can only apply to unidimensional factor specifications
and the asymptotic properties of their estimator are not well developed. A similar
model with an addition assumption of homogeneous effects of common shocks can
be estimated by using the hybrid Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm developed
in Pang (2009). The big advantages of using the Bayesian approach lie in its modularity of estimating algorithms and its flexibility of accommodating unbalanced data
structures. By treating unobserved factors and factor loadings as parameters, the
Bayesian approach allows them to be arbitrarily correlated with regressors. The algorithm applied to estimate the model is based on Pang (2009): it uses the Cholesky
decomposition to diagonalize the variance-covariance matrix and adds an auxiliary
variable to orthogonalize the idiosyncratic error term. The algorithm includes five
Gibbs steps for augmenting the latent data and updating most parameters, and an
MH chain to update the autoregressive coefficients. A partial group move multigrid
Monte Carlo method is used to speed up MCMC mixing, as is applied in Pang (2009).
The detailed prior assignments, MCMC algorithm, and Bayes factor computational
scheme are reported in the Appendices 4.6.1, 4.6.2, and 4.6.3.

4.4

Empirical Results and Interpretation

I apply the GLMM-TSUV.AR(p) model to empirically test the regime-dependent
effect of regime duration by using an interaction term,
anocracy∗duration, and investigate the impacts of observed and unobserved common shocks on sovereign default by estimating the time-specific unit-varying effects
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of common shocks. Another interaction, democracy∗duration, is included to test
whether the effect of regime duration varies with democracy level or whether the
effect of the level of democracy is altered by regime duration. To estimate the
country-varying effects of common shocks, I use country-specific coefficients for both
observed (US.Interest and world.growth) and unobserved (f ) common shocks. A
country-specific random intercept is included in the model to control for unobserved
heterogeneity. I estimate the model with different lag orders and different numbers of
unobserved factors. The Bayes factors support the model with an AR(1) error process
and one unobserved factor. The empirical results based on models with more factors
and high lag orders are all very similar to GLMM-TSUV1F.AR(1). I only report
two of them, i.e., GLMM-TSUV2F.AR(1) and GLMM-TSUV1F.AR(2). I also estimate the same specification (GLMM-TSUV1F.AR(1)) with an alternative measure
of the variable anocracy by using the subinterval [−3, 3]. Furthermore, just to show
how much difference this more realistic model makes on the fixed-effect coefficients,
I compare the model with a simple probit model and a model with the assumption
that common shocks have the same effects on all countries. Interestingly, for the
model with constant effects of common shocks, the MCMC draws demonstrates very
strong serial correlation, which casts the doubt on stationarity of the error process and
cointegration relations. With more than 5,000,000 iterations the Markov chain still
demonstrates strong evidence of nonconverge, as shown in Appendix 4.6.5. Although
the Markov chain fails to converge, I graphically summarize the MCMC output in
Appendix 4.6.5, but do not compare the output with other models, since the draws
are likely not from the stationary distribution.
In Figure 4.3, I summarize the posterior distributions of the fixed-effect coefficients based on five models and also present their marginal likelihood. The posterior
distributions based on various GLMM-TSUV models are very similar, and using one
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or two unobserved factors do not make any important difference. Because serial
correlation is estimated to be positive but weak (0.2 at the mean level), correcting
serial correlation improves model quality (the Bayes factor of GLMM-TSUV.AR(1)
vs. GLMM-TSUV.AR(0) is 1.140), but does not make notable difference in posteriors
of the fixed-effect coefficients. Coding anocracy as polity score between −3 and +3
changes the magnitude of the posterior mean of anocracy and its interaction with
duration, but the directions are unchanged and error bands roughly the same. It
also leaves the coefficient parameters associated with other variables almost unaffected. The posteriors of the completely pooled probit model are saliently different
from other models: the error bands are much smaller and biased towards 0 most of
the time. The model suggests that US interest rate has a positive effect at a 95%
level of credibility, but based on the four other models, this positive effects is only at
a 70% level of credibility; as well, the interaction term of anocracy and duration
has a much smaller and more uncertain positive effect on sovereign default based
on the probit model than other models. The Bayes factors least prefer the probit
model and decisively support the GLMM-TSUV1F.AR(1) model over all four other
models. In the rest of this paper, I analyze the empirical results mainly based on the
GLMM-TSUV1F.AR(1) model.
Based on GLMM-TSUV1F.AR(1), the posterior of the interaction term, anocracy*duration,
confirms the theory that, regime duration of anocracies affects sovereign default differently from that of non-anocracies. As shown in the left graph in Figure 4.4, under
nonanocratic regime the effect of regime duration is negative with high certainty. The
substantive implication is that as regime age increases, the likelihood of sovereign default decreases in nonanocracies, ceteris paribus, but anocracy drives the effect to an
opposite direction: more than half of the posterior draws of regime duration lie on
the right hand side of zero, and at the 70% credibility level we can conclude that as
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Figure 4.3: Posterior Summary: Fixed-Effect Coefficients in Five Competing Models
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Marginal Likelihood GLMM-TSUV1F.AR(1): −598.775, GLMM-TSUV2F.AR(1):
−604.273, GLMM-TSUV1F.AR(0): −601.409, Anocracy[−3, 3]: −601.076, Probit:
−654.583
regime age increases, an anocratic government is more likely to default on its external debt, holding other things constant. In Figure 4.4, the right graph presents the
duration-dependent effect of anocracy: anocracies tend to be more likely to default
when regime duration is longer. In the first couple of years of anocracies, regime
type does not have a clear effect on sovereign default, but upon staying in anocracy longer, major regime changes are more likely. A shorter time horizon makes an
anocratic government value future benefits less and more prefer sovereign default to
sacrificing current consumption.
Figure 4.5 shows estimated heterogeneity among countries. In all three graphs, the
sample countries are sorted by the posterior mean of the random effect. The left graph
shows the posteriors of the country-specific intercepts, which capture unobserved
heterogeneity across countries. With the selected covariates and unit-varying effects
of common shocks, the posteriors do not show much heterogeneity. The middle and
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right graphs in Figure 4.5 illustrate the variations of the effects of global GDP growth
and the US interest rate. In the model, the variations are captured by the grouplevel residual term (b2i and b3i ). The grand (average) effects of the two observed
common shocks are presented in Figure 4.3. Countries demonstrate different levels
of sensitivity or vulnerability to both of the observed common shocks in terms of
sovereign default: the range of the posterior mean of b2i for global GDP growth is
from −0.278 to 0.379 and of b3i for the US interest rate −0.128 to 0.241. Only ten
countries which are not sensitive (countries in the middle range in the graph) to global
GDP growth are also insensitive to US interest rate change. There are 12 countries
benefiting from both macroeconomic and liquidity shocks (the left third of countries
in both graphs), and13 countries vulnerable to both types of common shocks (the
right third of countries in both graphs). More than 70% of the sample countries
respond to the macro-economic shock differently from the global liquidity shock.
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Figure 4.5: Unobserved Heterogeneities and Varying Effects of Observed Common
Shocks
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Figure 4.6 shows the country-specific effects (γ i ) of unobserved common shocks
(ft ), the augmented unobserved common shocks themselves, and the time-specific
intercepts which capture time heterogeneity. The left graph shows that the sensitivity of the sample countries to unobserved common shocks varies at the posterior
mean level from −0.1333 to 0.183. With large error bands (a 95% credible intervals), the variation is not very salient but still demonstrates that countries respond
to unobserved common shocks differently even after the observed common shocks are
controlled for. Interestingly, countries follow a very similar pattern in terms of responding to unobserved common shocks as to global GDP growth: for 88.6% of the
countries (39 out of 44) which benefit from global GDP growth (the right 1/3 countries in Figure 4.5), unobserved common shocks are also most likely to reduce their
likelihood of sovereign default (the right 1/3 countries in Figure 4.6); 93.2% of the
most vulnerable countries (41 out of 44) to global GDP growth are also the countries
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most vulnerable to unobserved common shocks (the left 1/3 countries); and 82.6%
of countries insensitive to global GDP growth are barely affected by the unobserved
common shocks (the middle 1/3 countries). However, the pattern of country-specific
response to unobserved shocks is quite different from to that of the US interest rate,
and the percentages are 28.9%, 19.6% and 61.4% respectively. This may suggest that
the omitted or unobserved shocks are mostly macro-economic shocks besides global
GDP growth.
The middle graph in Figure 4.6 summarizes the augmented overall unobserved
shocks which have country-specific effects, and the right graph shows the unobserved
common shocks with the same effect on all countries, i.e., the time-specific intercepts.
To compare the two different types of shocks or the two component effects of unobserved shocks, I put the two graphs on the same scale. The mean time trends of
the two types of shocks are different from each other, and the error bands are much
smaller for the country-invariant unobserved shock than for the country-varying ones.
Both types of shocks demonstrate that in 2001 the unobserved shocks in the international system are strongest and in the direction of increasing sovereign default
probability. Methodologically, relaxing the assumption of constant effects of common
shocks avoids the non-cointegration problem: within-chain serial correlation reduces
greatly, and the posterior mean of the autoregressive coefficient is only around 0.2.
The chain converges much faster, and within-chain mixing is greatly improved (see
Appendix 4.6.5).
It is more intuitive to see how the common shocks in the system affect sovereign
default by looking at their effects on default probability instead of on the absolute
value at the latent level. Country-specific impacts of common shocks are calculated
by using all the MCMC posterior draws, conducting within-sample prediction, and
calculating the difference between predicted probabilities with and without taking
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account of the effects of common shocks. In Figure 4.7, I plot the mean levels of the
impacts of common shocks on default probability of all the sample country-years. The
left graph, with the sample country-years not sorted, shows the volatility of the impact of the international system on default probability, and the right graph shows the
distribution of this impact. Both graphs demonstrate that the international system
plays an important role in explaining countries’ decision making regarding sovereign
default: in some country-years, common shocks in the system can increase default
probability by as large as 56.80% or decrease it by 59.20%. For half of the countryyears, external shocks change default probability by more than 3.80%, holding other
variables constant. The impact on default probability also varies greatly, and its standard deviation is 0.118. Figure 4.8 shows the mean-level impact of external shocks
on each individual country over their sample years. On average, 44% of the sample
countries (59 countries) generally benefit from the international system in terms of
repaying their external debt, but system shocks increase default probability for other
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Figure 4.7: Unit-Varying Impact of Time-Specific Shocks I
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75 countries. Common shocks reduce the default likelihood most dramatically for
Jordan by 46.80%, other things equal; but the system increases default probability
most for Mauritania by 19.7% on average. There are 15 countries which are particularly vulnerable to the international system. It increases their default risk by more
than 10%. And there are another 3 countries besides Jordan (i.e., Angola, Gabon,
Democratic Republic of the Congo) whose default probabilities are lowered by the
international system by more than 10% at the mean level. Figure 4.9 shows the
impacts of common shocks in each year. In each year the response of countries to
common shocks varies greatly because of their own characteristics; and in different
years the volatility of the effect of common shocks are also different. In some years,
such as 1999 and 2000, the international system is more tranquil, but in 1992, 2001
and 2002, the overall impact of external shocks is much bigger than in the rest of the
sample years.
Finally, as for the control variables, the posteriors based on the GLMM-TSUV1F.AR(1)
model are summarized in Figure 4.3. Domestic GDP growth is important for countries to service their external debt. Slow economic growth predicts higher likelihood
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of sovereign default. While current account balance does not have a clear effect on
sovereign default, a high ratio of external debt to output is a dangerous sign that a
country may be insolvent and more likely to default. It seems that the configuration
of external debt does not matter when explaining sovereign default, and short-term
debt is not necessarily associated with high default probability, but having a big foreign exchange reserve relative to output in a country is important to avoid sovereign
default. Interestingly, trade openness is likely to be associated with higher default
probability, which does not confirm the conventional theory. This may be attributed
to the fact that for developing countries, an open economy often has a high degree of
sensitivity and vulnerability to external shocks. Even if trade openness can increase
a government’s incentive to repay debt, it may imply the capability to repay the
external debt of an open economy can be volatile because of international shocks.

4.5

Discussion

There are many studies in the literature trying to find a stable and reliable relationship between regime type and sovereign default, but empirical evidence is often
mixed when the relationship is treated as linear, unconditional, and outside the international context of sovereign default. This paper investigates this question from
a historical and international perspective by emphasizing the regime-dependent effect of regime duration and controlling for countries’ sensitivity or vulnerability to
the international system. I proposed a Bayesian multifactor generalized linear multilevel model motivated by the characteristics of the empirical data and the major
research goals of the current research. I applied the model to analyze time-series
cross-sectional data with 134 developing countries from 1990 to 2003, and the empirical findings suggest that regime duration of anocracies has a very different meaning
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from non-annocracies when explaining sovereign default. Anocratic governments have
shorter time horizons with increasing regime age, but governments of nonanocracies
expect higher likelihood of regime survival with a longer regime history. This finding
is also based on carefully controlling for an important but often neglected source of
variation, i.e., the country-specific effect of the external environment. Empirical evidence suggests that shocks in the international system strongly affect the national
decision-making regarding sovereign default in developing countries, and the impacts
of globalization vary widely from country to country. This finding not only suggests
that models without controlling for the international source of variation would generate misleading inferences, but also sheds light on questions about the importance
of globalization and its different meanings to different countries.

4.6
4.6.1

Appendix
Priors

The prior assignment for a GLMM-TSUV.AR(p) model with m unobserved factors
is as follows

β ∼ NK1 (β 0 , B0 ),

i,ti , ∼ N (0, 1),

{bi , γ i } ∼ NK2 +m (ςς , D),

where the vector ς is specified as: ς = (0, ..., 0, a1 , ..., am )
| {z } | {z }
K2

D−1 ∼ WK2 +m (dd0 , D0 ),
ρ ∼ Up (ρρ : ρ ∈ Sρ ),
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{ηη t , ft } ∼ Nm (00, E),

m

E−1 ∼ WK3 +m (ee0 , E0 ),

4.6.2

MCMC Algorithm

Following Pang (2009), I use the Cholesky decomposition to diagonalize the covariance
matrix Σξ i : Σξ i = Ω i +κII i (where κ is any constant). The symmetric positive definite matrix
Ω i is further decomposed as V 0iV i , in which V 0i is the lower triangular matrix produced by
the Cholesky decomposition. The covariance matrix is then expressed as Σxi i = V 0iV i +κII T .
By adding an auxiliary variable u i ∼ N (00, I ), the error term ξ i can be written as V 0iu i +  i ,
where  i ∼ N (0, κiI T ). Then, the MCMC algorithm is simplified as follows:
1. D−1 |{bi }, {γ i } ∼ WK2 +m (dd1 , D1 ) and E−1 |{ηη t , ft } ∼ Wm (ee1 , E1 ) , where d 1 =
PN
0 −1
E −1
d 0 + N , D1 = (D−1
0 +
0 +
i=1 (bi , γ i )(bi , γ i ) ) , e 1 = e 0 + T , and E1 = (E
PT
η t , ft }{ηη 0t , ft0 })−1
i=1 {η
0 B −
ui , Ui ), where Ui = (II T + V iV 0i /κ)−1 , and ū
ui = UiV i (zz i − x 0iβ − Wi,t
2. u i |· ∼ N (ū
i i

v 0i,ti η ti − fti γ i )/κi
0 b + v0 η + f 0 γ + q , κ )
3. zit |· ∼ T N (X0i,ti β + Wi,t
it i
ti i
i,ti ti
i i

PN 0 −1 −1
4. β|· ∼ NK1 (β̄, B1 ), where B1 = (B−1
0 +
i=1 x iΩ i xi ) ,


P
0 Ω −1 (z − W0 b − v 0 η − f γ ) ;
x
β̄ = B1 B0 β 0 + N
t
i
i
i i
i,ti
i,ti ti
i=1 i i
D −1 + (W
W i , fti )0Ω −1 (W
W i , fti ))−1 , and
5. {bi }, {γ i }|· ∼ NK2 +m (γ̄ 1 , Γ ), where Γ = (D


W i , fti )0Ω −1 (zi − xi β − v 0i,ti η ti ) + D−1ς .
γ̄ 1 = Γ (W
6. {η t , ft }|· ∼ Nm (f̄t , F1 ), where F1 = (E−1 + (vv it , γ i )0 (κNt I N )−1 (vv it , γ i ))−1
and f̄t = F 1 (vit , γ i )0 (κNt I N )−1 (zi − x0i β − Wt0 bNt − qt );
7. ρ |· ∼ Ψ(ρρ) × N (ρ̂ρ, P ), following Chib (1993), I use a Metropolis-Hasting algorithm to
update ρ by using the tailored kernel N (ρ̂ρ, P ).
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4.6.3

Bayes Factor Computational Scheme

I use the marginal likelihood approach of Chib (1995) and Chib and Jeliazkov (2001)
to compute the Bayes Factor. For the likelihood ordinate, denote by θ all the parameters,
except the auxiliary parameter u , and apply the following formula:
M N Ti
1 XYY
∗
ˆ
f (yy |θθ ) =
∆yiti 1 − ∆)1−yiti ,
M
m=1 i=1 ti =1


0 b + v 0 η + f 0 γ + q (m)
= X0i,ti β + Wi,t
i
ti i
i,ti ti
iti 
i
q
where, ∆ = Φ 
(m)
κi

(4.12)

The approach to approximate the posterior ordinate is as follows:

E ∗, η∗, f ∗, ρ∗, y )
π̂(β ∗ , b∗ , γ ∗ , D∗ , ρ ∗ , η ∗ , f ∗ , E∗ |y) = π̂(ρρ∗ |yy )π̂(η ∗ , f ∗ |ρρ∗ , y)π̂(E∗ |ρρ∗ , η ∗ , f ∗ , y )π̂(b∗ , γ ∗ |E
D ∗ |b∗ , γ ∗ , E∗ , η ∗ , f ∗ , ρ ∗ , y)π̂(β ∗ |D∗ , b∗ , γ ∗ , E∗ , η ∗ , f ∗ , ρ ∗ , y)
× π̂(D

1. For the ordinate π̂(ρρ∗ |yy ), denote all parameters except ρ and u as ψ :

π̂(ρρ∗ |yy ) =

J −1

PN 
i=1


α(ρρ(j) , ρ ∗ |yy , ψ (j) , u (j) , z (j) )q(ρρ(j) , ρ ∗ |yy , ψ (j) , u (j) , z (j) )

. (4.13)
P 
(k) , u (k) , z (k) )
∗ , ρ (k) |y
ρ
y
α(ρ
,
ψ
K −1 K
k=1

ψ , u , z |yy ), and the MCMC
The numerator is the sample expectation with respect to π(ψ
output can be directly used to integrate those parameters in the conditional part.
The denominator is the sample expectation with respect to the conditional product
ψ , u , z |yy )q(ρρ∗ , ρ |yy , ψ , u , z ). Here, one reduced run is needed: fix ρ at ρ ∗ ,
measure π(ψ
run a reduce run to get ψ and ρ (k) in each iteration by using ψ (k) , and then plug all
the draws of the parameters and augmented data into the denominator, and compute
the quantity.
2. π̂(η ∗ , f ∗ |ρρ∗ , y): directly use the reduced run conducted above;
3. π̂(E∗ |ρρ∗ , η ∗ , f ∗ , y ) = π̂(E∗ |η ∗ , f ∗ ): no reduced run is required;
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4. π̂(b∗ , γ ∗ |E∗ , η ∗ , f ∗ , ρ ∗ , y) =

QN

i=1 π(b

∗ , γ ∗ |η ∗ , f ∗ , ρ ∗ , z

i ):

Conduct a reduced run by

fixing E, η ∗ , f ∗ , ρ , and keep the output of β, D, z together with the fixed values to
compute this quantity;
D ∗ |b∗ , γ ∗ , E∗ , η ∗ , f ∗ , ρ ∗ , y) = π̂(D
D ∗ |b∗ , γ ∗ ): no reduced run is required here;
5. π̂(D
6. π̂(β ∗ |D∗ , b∗ , γ ∗ , E∗ , η ∗ , f ∗ , ρ ∗ , y) =

QN

i=1 π(β

∗

|b∗ , γ ∗ , η ∗ , f ∗ , ρ ∗ , z): conduct a reduced

run by fixing D, b, γ, E, η, f , ρ and keep the output of z together with the fixed values
of b∗ , γ ∗ , η ∗ , f ∗ , ρ ∗ to compute this quantity.

4.6.4

Sample Countries and Years

4.6.5

Nonstationarity of Error Process with Unit-Identical
Effects of Common Shocks
Figure 4.10: Parameter “Posteriors” Based on GLMM-AR(1)
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Table 4.2: Sample Countries and Years
Country

Years

Defaulting Episoda

Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belize
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi

1993-2003
1990-2003
1991-2003
1990-2003
1995-2003
1995-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1995-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
2001-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1993-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003

2000-2001
1995, 1997
1991-1995, 1998-2001
1990-1991, 2002-2003
1997-1998

Cambodia
Cameroon

1990-2003
1990-2003

1991
1990-1991, 1995-1996,
1998

Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
China
Chile
Colombia
Comoros
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Congo, Rep.
Costa Rica
Cote d’Ivoire

1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003

Croatia
Czech Republic
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Gabon

1995-2003
1995-2003
1996-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2001
1996-2003
1994-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003

Gambia
Georgia
Ghana
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran

1990-2003
1994-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003

Jamaica
Jordan

1990-2003
1990-2003

Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kyrgyzstan Republic
Laos
Latvia

1994-2003
1990-2003
1994-2003
1990-2003
1994-2003

1992
1996
1990-1993, 1999

1990, 1993
1993, 1997
1996

1999

1990
1993-1994
1990
1991, 1996, 1998
1991
1990-1991, 1994, 1997,
2002
1995, 2001

1990-1993
1990-1994, 2000
1993

1990-1993, 1997-1998,
2000, 2003
1994, 1996, 2002
2001
2000
1990-1992, 1994
1990
1994
1993, 1996, 1999
1993

1998-1999, 2002-2003
1994
1990, 1994
1990-1992, 1995-1996,
2000-2003
1998-1999
1993
1996, 1998
1991
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Years

Defaulting Episoda

Lebanon
Lesotho
Liberia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Nepal
Nicaragua

Country

1990-2003
1990-2003
1998-2003
1994-2003
1995-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1991-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1994-2003
1994-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003

1990

Niger
Nigeria

1990-2003
1990-2003

Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
The Philippines
Poland
Romania
Russia
Rwanda

1990-2002
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1991-2003
1991-2003
1994-2003
1990-2003

Samoa
Sao Tome & Principe
Senegal
Serbia and Montenegro
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Slovak Republic
Solomon Islands
South Africa
Sri Lanka
St. Kitts & Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent &
the Grenadines
Sudan
Swaziland
Syrian Arab Republic
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
Uruguay

1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
2000-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1995-2003
1990-2003
1996-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003

Uzbekistan
Vanuatu

1994-2003
1990-2003

Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe

1990-2003
1990-2003
1991-2003
1990-2003
1990-2001

1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1994-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1990-2003
1995-1998
1990-2003
1994-2003
1990-2003

1995, 2000

1998, 2002
1994-1995, 1999-2003
1990
1996, 1998, 2000, 2002

1990, 1998-1999, 2001
1990-1991, 1996-1997,
2001
1996, 2001-2002
1990, 1992-1993, 2001

2000-2001
1990-1993, 1995
1990
1990, 1993-1995, 1998
1990-1992
1991, 1993-1994
1994-1996, 1998, 2000
1998

1997, 2000
1994, 1998
2000, 2003
1991, 2001
1990-1991, 1993, 1997
1992, 1995, 2000

2003
1993-1994, 2001

31995-1996, 2002
1990
1990, 1992, 1995
1990-1991

1996
1990, 1995, 1998
1994-1995, 1999-2000,
1991, 2003
2003
1997, 2002

1990
1991-1994, 2001
1991, 1993, 1996
2001

Figure 4.11: Convergence and Fixing (GLMM-AR(1) Model)
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Figure 4.12: Convergence and Fixing (GLMM-TSUV.AR(1) Model)
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Chapter 5
Conclusion

In this dissertation, I propose a Bayesian generalized linear multilevel model with pthorder autoregressive errors for modeling inter-temporal dependence, contemporary correlation, and heterogeneity of unbalanced binary. I also extended this model with a multifactor
specification to analyze time-specific unit-varying effects. The models are applied to several
political economy studies including civil war, state failure, and sovereign default.
This dissertation makes several contributions to the literature. The proposed models
extend the existing methods in longitudinal analysis to allow very rich dynamics and carefully distinguishes political dynamics and heterogeneity from one another. This facilitates
political scientists to better understand political dynamics and conduct cross country comparative studies. Modeling heterogeneity also avoids drawing over-generalized conclusions
in Time-Series Cross-Section data analyses. I develop an efficient algorithm for posterior
estimation by innovatively orthogonalizing errors (the Cholesky decomposition and auxiliary parameter approach) and applying the parameter expansion method (the partial group
move multigrid Monte Carlo updating). In addition, I provide an algorithm for Bayes factor computation, which is used for serial correlation diagnostics, lag order determination,
variable selection, and forecasts. Finally, the model and methods are applied to an empiri-
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cal study to test important theories in political economy. It also contributes to answering
the practical questions on sustainable development of the developing countries and global
financial stability.
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